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JUDICIARY
Tara Leigh Grove*
Scholars have long worried about the legitimacy of the Supreme
Court. But commentators have largely overlooked the inferiorfederal
judiciary-andthe potentialtradeoffs between Supreme Court and lower
court legitimacy. This Essay aims to call attention to those tradeoffs.
When theJusticesareasked to change the law in high-profileareas-such
as abortion, affirmative action, orgun rights-theyface a conundrum:
To protect the legitimacy of the Court, the Justices may be reluctant to
issue the broadprecedents that will most effectively clarify the law-and
thereby guide the lower courts. The Justices may instead opt for narrow
doctrines or deny review altogether. But such an approachputs tremendouspressureon the lower courts, which must take the lead on the content
of federal law in these high profile areas. Presidents, senators, and
interestgroups then zero in on the composition of the lower courts-in

ways that threaten the long-term legitimacy of the inferior federal
judiciary. Drawing on political science and history, this Essay explores
these legitimacy tradeoffs within ourfederaljudicial hierarchy. To the
extent that our legal system aims to protect the legitimacy of the judiciary,
we should consider not simply the Supreme Court but the entirefederal
bench.

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1556

I.

THE (OVER) EMPHASIS ON SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY ................

II. PRESSURE ON THE LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIARY .................................

1563
1566

* Charles E. Tweedy, Jr., Endowed Chairholder of Law & Director, Program in
Constitutional Studies, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to Aaron Bruhl,
Evan Criddle, Neal Devins, Heather Elliott, Richard Fallon, David Fontana, Amanda Frost,
Mike Gilbert, Russell Gold, Mark Graber, Debbie Hellman, Bert Huang, Aziz Huq, Ben
Kassow, Amy Kimpel, Ron Krotoszynski, David Landau, Alli Larsen, Marin Levy, Henry
Monaghan, Jim Pfander, Richard Re, Neil Siegel, and Larry Solum for comments on earlier
drafts. This paper was presented at the University of Virginia School of Law: Federal Courts
Seminar, the University of Wisconsin Law School: Discussion Group on Constitutionalism,
the University of San Diego School of Law, William and Mary Law School, the University of
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law: Discussion Group on Constitutionalism, the
University of Alabama School of Law, Twenty-Third Annual Faculty Conference: Federalist
Society for Law and Public Policy, and the Loyola University Chicago School of Law:
Eleventh Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium. I am grateful for the comments I received
at those events.

1555

1556
A.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:5

The Consequences of "All Deliberate Speed"......................... 1566

1. The Creation of "All Deliberate Speed" .............................. 1566
2. Sacrificing Meaningful Change ............................................ 1568
3. A More Contentious Appointments Process........................ 1571
B.

The Impact of the Undue Burden Standard ........................... 1575
1. Background: Roe's Trimester Framework and the Political
Response ............................................................................. 1575
2. The Creation of the Undue Burden Standard .................... 1576
3. Casey and the Lower Court Selection Process...................... 1579

III. TRADEOFFS WITHIN THEJUDICIAL HIERARCHY.................................1581

A.

Can Supreme Court Precedent Constrain? ............................. 1581
1. The Legal Obligation and Norms of Constraint ................. 1582
2. The Theory: The Constraining Impact of Rules.................. 1583

3. Empirical Support................................................................. 1584
4. The Potential Value of Constraint........................................ 1587
B.

Protecting Supreme Court Legitimacy .................................... 1589

C.

Overlooked Effects on the Lower Courts................................. 1592
1. Elite Attitudes Toward the Lower Federal Courts ............... 1593
2. Long-Term Effects on Public Reputation ..............

1595

3. Why Lower Court Sociological Legitimacy Matters............. 1596

D. The Likelihood of a Tradeoff................................................... 1599
IV. IMPLICATIONS ...................................................................................

1601

A.

What It Takes for a Constitutional Revolution ........................ 1601

B.

The Narrow Focus on Supreme Court Legitimacy.................. 1603
1. A Contingency: Interpretive Method ................................... 1603
2. Saving the Court: Minimalism and the Passive Virtues ....... 1607

C.

Expanding the Focus to the Entire Judiciary........................... 1609

1. The Impact of a Minimalist Approach ................................. 1610
2. Exploring the Legitimacy Tradeoffs..................................... 1611
CONCLUSION...........................................................................................

1615

INTRODUCTION

From time to time, Supreme Court watchers predict that we are on
the verge of a constitutional revolution.1 Many commentators today
1. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 24-25 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Justices] (noting that after Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush "filled five
a conservative revolution was at hand");
vacancies," various "Court-watchers claimed ...
Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Laura Bronner, How a Conservative 6-3 Majority Would

Reshape the Supreme Court, FiveThirtyEight (Sept. 28, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
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forecast a sea change in the Court's jurisprudence on high-profile issues,
such as abortion,2 affirmative action, gun rights,' and the administrative
state.5 Although some observers celebrate this prospect,6 many others fear
the anticipated revolution. 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court is
increasingly under fire. Critics have questioned the Court's legitimacy8
and called for structural reforms that would have been almost unthinkable
a few years ago, including "packing" the Court with additional members.9
features/how-a-conservative-6-3-majority-would-reshape-the-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/
ZD9R-8VV3] (asserting that "the chances of 'a conservative revolution' on the court are
high"); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1051-61 (2001) (discussing "a veritable revolution in
constitutional doctrine" with respect to federalism and civil rights).

2. See Clare Huntington, Abortion Talk, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 1043, 1044 (2019) (noting
that many "anticipate significant" changes "if not a complete repudiation of Roe v. Wade").
3. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 117 Mich.
L. Rev. 1107, 1117 (2019) (predicting that "there are now five justices to strike down all

affirmative action programs").
4. See Adam Liptak, Justice Barrett's Vote Could Tilt the Supreme Court on Gun

Rights, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/us/supremecourt-barrett-gun-rights.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (noting the anticipated
changes to Second Amendment doctrine).
5. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term-Foreword: 1930s Redux:
The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (2017) [hereinafter Metzger,
Administrative State] (critiquing "contemporary anti-administrativism").
6. Some commentators endorse certain aspects of the predicted change in doctrine.
See, e.g., John Yoo & James Phillips, Roberts Thwarted Trump, but the Census Ruling Has
a Second Purpose, Atlantic (July 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2019/07/liberals-helped-roberts-undercut-bureaucratic-state/593737
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (celebrating that "[t]he counterrevolution is on ...
against an
administrative state run amok"); see also Joyce Lee Malcolm, Defying the Supreme Court:
Federal Courts and the Nullification of the Second Amendment, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 295,
311 (2018) (arguing that "[i]t is long past time for the Supreme Court" to protect the
Second Amendment).

7. See supra notes 2-5.
8. The attacks on the Court's legitimacy were ignited in part by recent confirmation
battles: Critics argue that Republicans used underhanded means to cement a conservative
majority on the Court-and thereby make possible a constitutional revolution. See Tara

Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2240, 2240-42
(2019) [hereinafter Grove, Legitimacy Dilemma] (discussing the controversies surrounding
Merrick Garland, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh and the attacks on the Court's
"legitimacy"); see also, e.g.,John F. Harris, The Supreme Court Is Begging for a Legitimacy

Crisis, Politico (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/
29/supreme-court-begging-for-legitimacy-crisis-433573
[https://perma.cc/UZ3C-L2A4]
(arguing that the confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett "days before a presidential election"
undermines the Court's legitimacy).
9. See Opinion, How to Fix the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (collecting proposals); Larry Kramer, Pack the
Courts, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/
opinion/pack-supreme-court.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). Some critics call
for a federal statute imposing term limits on Supreme Court Justices. See John Kruzel,
Dozens of Legal Experts Throw Weight Behind Supreme Court Term Limit Bill, Hill (Oct.
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Whatever one thinks of the merits of the anticipated legal changes (or
structural reforms), it seems that all eyes are on the Supreme Court.
This Essay argues that the narrow emphasis on the Supreme Court
overlooks the broader reality of the federal judiciary. The Court cannot
achieve legal change unilaterally; it must act through the lower federal
courts.10 And with respect to high-profile issues, the Justices may face a
twofold dilemma: unappealing tradeoffs between legitimacy and legal
change, and between Supreme Court and lower court legitimacy.
Let us begin with the first tradeoff: To most effectively ensure legal
change on high-profile and contested issues, the Court should clarify the
law through broad, rule-like precedents. Although ideology plays a limited
role in most lower court decisions, empirical research suggests that judges
are more likely to vote in predictable "conservative" or "progressive"
directions on issues such as abortion, affirmative action, or gun rights." As
a result, the Supreme Court should take special care to guide-or "rein
in"-its judicial inferiors in these areas. But the Justices may feel
considerable pressure not to issue broad, rule-like doctrines in precisely

23,

2020),

https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/522447-dozens-of-legal-experts-

throw-weight-behind-supreme-court-term-limit [https://perma.cc/WRW9-B6LM]. Suzanna
Sherry advocates a statute prohibiting concurring and dissenting opinions-to reduce the

emphasis on individual

Justices'

votes. See Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and

How to Fix It), 106 Iowa L. Rev. 181, 182 (2020). Dan Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman have
provocatively called for either a fifteen-member Supreme Court or one that would
consist of nine-member panels drawn from the entire pool of federal appellate court
judges. See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 Yale
L.J. 148, 181-84 (2019) (proposing a "Supreme Court Lottery," under which the Court
would consist of all federal appellate court judges, who would randomly serve on nineJustice panels for two-week periods); id. at 193-96 (proposing in the alternative a
"Balanced Bench," which would encompass a fifteen-member Court, with five affiliated
with the Democratic Party, five affiliated with the Republican Party, and the remaining five
selected by the first ten); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Supreme Court as Superweapon: A

Response to Epps & Sitaraman, 129 Yale L.J. Forum 93, 94-100 (2019) (critiquing the
proposals). But much recent discussion focuses on expanding the size of the Supreme Court
(a reform that is often described as "court packing"). See Richard Wolf, Pack the Court?
Battles Between Republicans and Democrats Fuel Clash over Supreme Court's Future, USA

Today

(Oct.

25, 2020),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/10/25/

could-amy-coney-barretts-confirmation-fuel-supreme-court-expansion/3716562001
[https://perma.cc/H2ZD-QDN4]. The calls for court packing push against a strong norm.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the

Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 Geo. L.J. 255, 278-87 (2017); Tara Leigh Grove, The
Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 505-17 (2018)
[hereinafter

Grove, Judicial

Independence];

see

also

infra

notes

315-320

and

accompanying text (noting other proposed Court reforms).
10. This Essay focuses on the lower federal courts, which seem most likely to handle
the hot-button issues that are the focus of so much commentary today. State court legitimacy
raises important but different questions, which I hope to address in later work.
11. See infra section IILA; see also Lee Epstein, William E. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational

Choice 168, 213-14, 237 (2013) (reporting that "ideological voting is less frequent" in the
lower courts than in the Supreme Court).
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these high-profile contexts-particularly when the Justices perceive that
the Supreme Court is under attack. Broad doctrinal rules raise the stakes
of any decision and could invite additional attacks against the Court or
even lead to noncompliance. Accordingly, the Justices may be tempted to
issue narrow decisions or flexible standards or to deny certiorari in highprofile cases-and allow the lower federal courts to work out the details.
In short, to preserve the external reputation (sociological legitimacy) of
the Supreme Court, the Justices may opt not to issue the broad, rule-like
doctrines most conducive to legal change.
But that leads to a second tradeoff: There are considerable risks to
the lower courts when they must take the lead on the content of federal
law in high-profile areas. As noted, absent clear guidance from the
Supreme Court, inferior federal judges tend to be more influenced by
ideology in ruling on certain high-profile cases, such as those involving
abortion or affirmative action. At a minimum, political actors and interest
groups assume that the law in these areas will depend on the composition
of the lower federal courts.12 This assumption puts pressure on Presidents
and senators to emphasize judicial ideology in lower federal court
appointments. And, indeed, over the past several decades, the selection of
inferior federal courtjudges has grown increasingly partisan and divisive. 13
Some research suggests that this very divisiveness undermines public
respect for-that is, the legitimacy of-the lower federal courts.1 4
We thus see the twofold dilemma: To avoid sacrificing the legitimacy
of the Supreme Court, the Justices may sacrifice both meaningful legal
change and the long-term legitimacy of the inferior federal bench.
Two prominent historical episodes vividly illustrate this conundrum.1 5
The "all deliberate speed" formula in Brown Hwas, in significant part, an
effort to protect the Court's public reputation; the Justices worried that
segregationists would refuse to comply with a firm deadline." This opaque
test, in turn, both sacrificed meaningful legal change and delegated
desegregation to the inferior federal judiciary-leading to some of the
earliest lower court confirmation wars. In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, the
Justices-again, to protect the Court's sociological legitimacy-declined
either to overrule Roe v. Wade or to retain its broad, rule-like trimester
framework.17 Instead, the Court crafted the "undue burden" standard,
which inferior federal judges have applied in distinct and often

12. See infra section III.C.1.
13. See infra section III.C.1.
14. See infra section III.C.3.
15. See infra Part II.

16. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown Ii), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (directing federal
district courts to enforce desegregation orders with "all deliberate speed").

17. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (rejecting "the rigid trimester framework of
Roe v. Wade" while reaffirming the case's "central holding").
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ideologically predictable ways. 18 This test has also raised the stakes forand the contentiousness of-lower court selection.
Recent events underscore the risks to the inferior federal judiciary.
There seems to have been an uptick in negative rhetoric about the lower
courts-including, specifically, accusations that federal judges decide
cases on ideological grounds. President Trump, for example, denounced
adverse lower court rulings as the handiwork of "Obama judges.""
Although ChiefJustice Roberts and other jurists have pushed back against
the charge that there are "Obama judges" or "Trump judges," 20 some
commentators insist that lower court judges vote in ideologically predictable directions. 21 This commentary has, however, failed to appreciate that
any such ideological voting depends in significant part on Supreme Court
precedent. The Court could rein in its judicial inferiors through broad,
rule-like doctrines-and thereby help protect the public reputation of the
lower federal courts. But the Justices may opt instead for opaque tests in
an effort to safeguard the reputation of the Court itself.
This analysis has important implications for constitutional scholarship
and jurisprudence. First, this account pushes against the assumption of
some scholars that the Supreme Court can easily resolve controversial issues of constitutional law and thereby launch a constitutional revolution. 22
To the extent that the Justices are concerned about the Court's public
reputation, they may be least inclined to resolve precisely those issues on
which lower courts most need guidance. 23
18. See id. at 874-79; infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text (discussing how
lower federal courts have applied the "undue burden" standard).
19. See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
20. Mark Sherman, Roberts, Trump Spar in Extraordinary Scrap overJudges, AP News

(Nov.

21,

2018),

https://www.apnews.com/c4b34f9639e141069c08cfle3deb6b84

[https://perma.cc/Q9SG-TVDL]; see also Jess Bravin, No Obama or Trump Judges Here,
Appointees of Both Declare, Wall St. J. (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
judges-say-they-arent-extensions-of-presidents-who-appointed-them-11568566598
(on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
21. See Ramesh Ponnuru, The Chief Justice's Defense of the Federal Judiciary, Nat'l
Rev. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/chief-justice-john-robertsdefends-the-federal-judiciary (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that Chief
Justice Roberts's statement that there are no "Obama judges or Trump judges" is "pretty
obviously untrue" because "[t]he decisions of judges appointed by Clinton and Obama
generally differ, in predictable ways, from the decisions of judges appointed by Bush and
Trump"); Marc A. Thiessen, Opinion, Chief Justice Roberts Is Wrong. We Do Have Obama
Judges and Trump Judges., Wash. Post (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/chief-justice-roberts-is-wrong-we-do-have-obama-judges-and-trump-judges/2018/

11/23/ee8de9a2-ef2c-11e8-8679-934a2b33be52_story.html

(on file with the Columbia Law

Review).
22. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text; see also Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1385
(1997) (viewing the Court "as the authoritative settler of constitutional meaning").
23. This analysis thus links up with the important literature on "stealth overruling" or
"narrowing" of Supreme Court precedents. Compare Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth
Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2010)
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Second, and more fundamentally, this analysis underscores that
scholarship on judicial legitimacy has focused too narrowly on the
Supreme Court.24 Many scholars argue that the justices should decide cases
with an eye to protecting the Court's sociological legitimacy. 5 Alexander
Bickel and Cass Sunstein, for example, urge the Court to issue narrow
("minimalist") rulings or deny certiorari in controversial matters so as to
avoid provoking external criticism. 6 These scholars have overlooked the
impact that such narrow or nonexistent decisions may have on the longterm legitimacy of the remainder of the federal bench. As this Essay
underscores, once we take into account the entire judicial system, it is far
from clear which level of the federal judiciary is better equipped to
shoulder external attacks.
At the outset, a few points of clarification. First, this Essay focuses on
sociological legitimacy: the external reaction to the decisions of the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. But this Essay does not simply
consider the reaction of the general public; the broader public is often
unaware of the actions of the judiciary, particularly the lower courts.
Accordingly, this Essay also considers-as relevant to sociological
legitimacy-the perspective of government officials and political elites
(including interest groups) who tend to care deeply about judicial
decisionmaking.2 7 When the Justices refrain from issuing a broad ruling,
they may be concerned about the reaction of any of these external

(criticizing "stealth overruling"), with Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme

Court, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1861, 1865-66 (2014) (defending "narrowing").
24. See infra Part I and section IV.B.
25. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 Ariz. L.
Rev. 1107, 1151 (1995) (arguing that "the Court must take care to preserve the esteem in

which it is held"); Gillian E. Metzger, Considering Legitimacy, 18 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
353, 364 (2020) (asserting that "concerns about preserving public support for the Court
fall within the bounds of reasonable constitutional adjudication"); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory
Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United

States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 Duke L.J. 703, 712 (1994) ("The Court wisely
attends to its legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

. . .");

Michael L. Wells, "Sociological

Legitimacy" in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1011, 1051 (2007) (urging
that the Court should decide cases so as to preserve "sociological legitimacy"); infra Part IV.
26. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the

Bar of Politics 69-72, 132, 250-56 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Bickel, Least Dangerous
Branch]; Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time:Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
3-23, 39-41 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, One Case]; infra section IV.B.
27. Over the past several decades, Presidents, senators, and interest groups have
increasingly zeroed in on the lower federal courts. See infra sections II.A.3, II.B.3, III.C.1.
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groups. 28 Likewise, any of these groups may zero in on the composition of
the inferior federal courts.2 9
Second, this Essay does not claim that there is a legitimacy tradeoff
with respect to every constitutional question. The analysis here focuses on
legal issues that are both highly salient and contested, such as abortion,
affirmative action, and gun rights. In less salient (or less contested) areas
of constitutional law, the Justices may have little to lose in articulating clear
doctrine, and lower court nominees are unlikely to be quizzed about their
views on low-profile issues. But notably, the category of highly salient and
contested areas is not a static one. An issue may become more or less
salient over time. 30 This Essay thus does not aim to define a fixed set of
highly salient and contested issues but instead seeks to identify a
phenomenon-legitimacy tradeoffs within the federaljudicial hierarchythat can arise with respect to whatever divisive issues exist at a given point
in our constitutional development.
Finally, this Essay does not argue that the contentious nature of lower
court selection can be traced exclusively to Supreme Court doctrine.
There are several interrelated factors, including the rise in party polarization, the growing influence of interest groups, and changes in Senate
procedure. 31 But the historical events and social science research canvassed in this Essay demonstrate that the Court's doctrinal choices are an
important-and largely overlooked-contributing factor.
28. Scholars debate whether the Justices are primarily concerned about the views of
elites or the general public. For purposes of this Essay, it is sufficient to assume-to the
extent the Justices consider external views-that they may care about any of these external
groups. Compare Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, The Company They Keep: How Partisan
Divisions Came to the Supreme Court, at xi (2019) (arguing that the Justices are "elites who
seek to win favor with other elites"), with Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How
Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the
Constitution 16 (2009) [hereinafter Friedman, Will of the People] (arguing that the
Supreme Court "ratif[ies] the American people's considered views about the ...
Constitution"), and Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve
America 3 (2006) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions often reflect public opinion better

than Congress).
29. See Nancy Scherer, Scoring Points: Politicians, Activists, and the Lower Federal

Court Appointment Process 21-22 (2005) (emphasizing interest group influence over
judicial nominations); Amy Steigerwalt, Battle over the Bench: Senators, Interest Groups,
and Lower Court Confirmations 10-13 (2010) (recognizing that, at least by the 1980s,
interest groups focused on lower court confirmations); see also Lauren Cohen Bell, Warring
Factions: Interest Groups, Money, and the New Politics of Senate Confirmation 8-12 (2002)
(discussing interest group influence in executive and judicial nominations).
30. As discussed below, abortion became a more divisive matter in national politics
after the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. See infra section II.B.1.
31. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice & Dissent: The Struggle to Shape
the Federal Judiciary 145 (2009) [hereinafter Binder & Maltzman, Advice] (emphasizing
the importance of the "institutional rules and practices" of the Senate); Scherer, supra note
29, at 4-5, 21-22 (arguing that "the parties use [lower court] nominations to curry favor
with only an elite constituency within each party"); Benjamin Wittes, Confirmation Wars:
Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times 57-60 (updated paperback ed. 2009)
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The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I introduces readers to the literature on legitimacy, which has long emphasized the Supreme Court alone.
Part II then provides a historical overview of how the Court has struggled
to provide clear guidance on high-profile issues, such as desegregation and
abortion, and both Parts II and III explore how that lack of guidance
impacts the lower federal courts. Finally, Part IV examines how this analysis
implicates normative debates overjudicial legitimacy, minimalism, and the
passive virtues. Jurists and scholars, this Essay contends, should begin to
reckon with the legitimacy tradeoffs within our hierarchical system.
I. THE (OVER) EMPHASIS ON SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY
There is a rich literature on the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. Political scientists focus on sociological legitimacy, arguing that the Court
can function effectively only if it has external support. 32 After all, the Court
has no army; it must rely on others to comply with its decrees. 33
Government officials and the general public are more likely to obey if they
view the Court as "legitimate"-that is, as an institution that should have
the power to determine legal rights and obligations. 34 It is particularly
important that those who disagree with a given ruling view the Court as
legitimate; such disappointed individuals will respect the adverse decision
if they consider the institution itself to be authoritative. 35 Political scientists
thus often say that "legitimacy is for losers." 36
Political scientists disagree about the source and nature of the
Supreme Court's sociological legitimacy. Many scholars argue that the

(tracing "the decline of the [lower court selection] process ...
to the growth of judicial
power that began with the Brown decision"); Keith E. Whittington, Partisanship, Norms, and

Federal Judicial Appointments, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 521, 530 (2018) [hereinafter
Whittington, Partisanship] (emphasizing growing party polarization).
32. See, e.g., Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological
Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 184,
184 (2013) ("For an institution like the U.S. Supreme Court to render rulings that carry
authoritative force, it must maintain a sufficient reservoir of institutional legitimacy .... ").
33. See Mark D. Ramirez, Procedural Perceptions and Support for the U.S. Supreme
Court, 29 Pol. Psych. 675, 675 (2008) (noting that "the Supreme Court does not possess the
budgetary power of Congress or the enforcement power of the President").

&

34. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations:
Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People 38-39 (2009); Bartels
Johnston, supra note 32, at 184.
35. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 34, at 38-39 ("Legitimate institutions are those
recognized as appropriate decision-making bodies even when one disagrees with the
outputs of the institution." (emphasis omitted)).
36. E.g., James L. Gibson, Milton Lodge & Benjamin Woodson, Losing, but Accepting:

Legitimacy, Positivity Theory, and the Symbols ofJudicial Authority, 48 Law & Soc'y Rev.
837, 839 (2014).
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Court enjoys broad "diffuse support."37 Under this view, the public generally sees the Court as performing a different function from the political
branches and treats its decisions as reasonable and binding, regardless of
the outcome of a specific case. 38 But a growing literature challenges this
perspective. The challengers-"specific support" scholars-argue that
members of the public tend to support the Court only if they like the
results in specific high-profile cases. 39 In other words, "individuals grant or
deny the Court legitimacy based on the ideological tenor of the Court's
policymaking."40
Notably, even diffuse support scholars assert that public respect for
the Supreme Court is contingent, at least in the long run. Recall that it is
crucial for the "losers" to view the Court as an authoritative decisionmaker
so that they will respect an adverse decision. Scholars agree that a series of
adverse decisions in salient cases could lessen the Court's support among
a particular group.41 If the Supreme Court, for example, repeatedly issued
"conservative" (or "progressive") decisions in high-profile cases, its institutional reputation would eventually decline with the "loser" group.
Accordingly, both camps agree that the Supreme Court's decisions in
high-profile cases can affect its sociological legitimacy, at least in the long

&

37. Political scientists differentiate "specific support" (support for a single Court
action) from "diffuse support" (long-term support, regardless of the Court's actions). See
Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme
Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 Law

Soc'y Rev. 357, 370 (1968).
38. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 34, at 61-62 ("[S]upport for the Court has little
if anything to do with ideology and partisanship."); James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson,
Changes in Institutional Support for the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court's Legitimacy

Imperiled by the Decisions It Makes?, 80 Pub. Op.

Q.

622, 623-24 (2016) (offering empirical

support for the conventional view that diffuse support is "sticky").
39. See Bartels & Johnston, supra note 32, at 185-87 (arguing that high-profile cases,
i.e., those that "receive ample attention from the media and political elites, are important
topics in election campaigns, and have facilitated the formation of significant ideological
cleavages in American politics," play an outsized role in how the "mass public" forms
opinions about the Court's legitimacy); Neil Malhotra & Stephen A. Jessee, Ideological

Proximity and Support for the Supreme Court, 36 Pol. Behav. 817, 819 (2014) (finding that
individuals "who are ideologically closest to the Court's position tend to exhibit the highest
levels of trust and approval"); see also Dino P. Christenson & David M. Glick, Chief Justice
Roberts's Health Care Decision Disrobed: The Microfoundations of the Supreme Court's

Legitimacy, 59 Am.

J.

Pol. Sci. 403, 415-16 (2015) (finding that public attitudes can be

changed by "a single, albeit salient, case"); supra note 37 (defining "specific support").
40. Bartels & Johnston, supra note 32, at 185.
41. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 34, at 43 (" [G]ver the long haul, the repeated
failure of an institution to meet policy expectations can weaken and even destroy that
institution's legitimacy in the eyes of disaffected groups."); see also id. (noting that support
for the Court among African Americans has declined in recent decades); James L. Gibson
& Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional Wisdoms

and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 201, 206-07 (2014) (" [T]he
Court's diffuse support could suffer
dissatisfaction is reached.").
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run. And for those who accept the "specific support" view, any individual
decision in a salient case may affect the Court's external reputation.
This possibility raises a challenging normative question for jurists and
legal scholars: Should the Justices decide cases so as to preserve the
sociological legitimacy of the Court? A number of scholars argue yes,
emphasizing that the Court cannot function without some level of external
support.42 Others raise questions about whether any such consideration of
sociological legitimacy is legally legitimate-that is, a normatively acceptable mode of legal reasoning. 43 But at a minimum, scholars seem to agree
that the Justices do decide at least some high-profile cases so as to protect
the sociological legitimacy of the Court.4 4
This Essay will return to some of these normative questions. For now,
the important point is that this debate over legal and sociological legitimacy focuses almost exclusively on the Supreme Court.45 Lost in the
discussion is the inferior federal judiciary. But this Essay aims to show that,
to the extent the Justices decide cases so as to protect the public reputation
of the Court, they may create risks for the remainder of the federal bench.
As Part IV discusses, once we expand our focus to the entire federal
judiciary, the normative question-should the Justices decide cases so as
to protect the Court's legitimacy?-becomes significantly more nuanced
and complex.

42. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text; infra sections IV.B-.C.
43. See infra section IV.B.1; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Law and Legitimacy in the
Supreme Court 21 (2018) [hereinafter Fallon, Law and Legitimacy] (distinguishing
sociological, moral, and legal legitimacy); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the
Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy

of Paul Mishkin, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1473, 1473-74 (2007) (examining the tension between
"the social legitimacy of the law as a public institution" and "the legal legitimacy of the law
as a principled unfolding of professional reason").

&

44. See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 43, at 111 (asserting that "the Justices
might [under threat] feel externally constrained to adopt positions that they think
constitutionally erroneous"); Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L.

Pol. 239, 240-42, 272 (2011); Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in
Comparative Perspective, 66 Duke L.J. 1, 3-4 (2016); Allison Orr Larsen, Judging "Under

Fire" and the Retreat to Facts, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1083,1090-91 (2020); see also Michael
D. Gilbert & Mauricio A. Guim, Active Virtues, 98 Wash. U. L. Rev. 857, 860 (2021) (arguing
that the Justices should not only avoid controversial cases but also take on politically
uncontroversial cases-what the authors call "unity cases"-in order to bolster the Court's
external legitimacy).
45. There is at least one exception. Neil Siegel argues that the Supreme Court can at
times work together with the lower courts to promote the external legitimacy of the entire
federal judiciary. See Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System,

70 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1186-87 (2017) [hereinafter Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation].
Section III.D discusses Siegel's thoughtful piece in greater detail. For now, it is enough to
note that Siegel does not address the issue at the heart of this Essay: the legitimacy tradeoffs
within the federal judicial hierarchy.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

1566

[Vol. 121:5

II. PRESSURE ON THE LOWER FEDERALJUDICIARY
To illustrate the tradeoffs faced by the federal judiciary, this Essay
begins with two prominent historical examples: the aftermath of Brown v.
Board ofEducationand PlannedParenthoodv. Casey. These episodes vividly
show how the Supreme Court's doctrinal choices may not only fail to
achieve meaningful legal change but also put tremendous pressure on the
inferior federal courts. Although there is a voluminous literature on
desegregation and abortion-and different scholars have recounted
aspects of the stories told here (accounts that this Essay draws upon)prior scholars have not focused on the lesson of this Essay: what these
episodes have to tell us about the legitimacy tradeoffs within the federal

judicial hierarchy.
A.

The Consequences of "All DeliberateSpeed"

1. The Creation of 'All Deliberate Speed". - In 1954, the Supreme Court
announced its watershed unanimous ruling in Brown, declaring that, "in
the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place." 4 6 But the Court did not issue a remedy. Instead, the Justices
scheduled the case for reargument to determine how the Court should
carry out its constitutional ruling.47
During the oral argument in Brown If, then-NAACP attorney
Thurgood Marshall implored the Justices to establish a firm deadline for
desegregation, directing that the process be complete by September 1956
at the latest.48 Absent a clear deadline, Marshall warned, "[T] he Negro in
this country would be in a horrible shape," as the lower courts allowed the
"several states [to] decide in their own minds as to how much time was
necessary." 4 9 Indeed, Marshall suggested that an open-ended standard
might leave students "worse off" than the "separate but equal" doctrine
because it would be challenging for NAACP attorneys to show when a
school district was violating the law.50 "In separate but equal," Marshall
explained, "we could count the number of books, the number of bricks,
the number of teachers and find out whether the school was physically
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal.").
47. See id. at 495-96 & n.13 (directing further argument over whether the Court
should itself "formulate detailed decrees" or instead "remand to the [district] courts" and,
if the latter, "what general directions" the Court should offer).

48. Transcript of Oral Argument, Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Nos. 1 to 5), in
Argument: The Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court in Brown vs. Board ofEducation of

Topeka, 1952-55, at 337, 393-94 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969) [hereinafter Brown II
Transcript] (urging the Court to "put a date certain" on desegregation (quoting Thurgood
Marshall)); see also MichaelJ. Klarman, FromJim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court

and the Struggle for Racial Equality 313 (2004) (noting that the NAACP "pressed for
immediate desegregation").
49. Brown IITranscript, supra note 48, at 400 (quoting Thurgood Marshall).

50. Id.

2021]

SACRIFICING LEGITIMACY

1567

equal or not."51 But if the Court issued an opaque test to govern
desegregation, "enforcement of [Brown] will be left to the judgment of the
district court with practically no safeguards."5 2
By contrast, the other participants in the case urged the Court to
proceed with caution. U.S. Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff argued that
the Court should require desegregation only "as speedily as feasible"-to
allow an "effective gradual adjustment." 53 And the attorneys for the states
argued for virtually unlimited district court discretion:54 The Court should
"trust the district judge to carry out the constitutional provisions" even if,
in some school districts, "it may well prove impossible to have
unsegregated schools in the reasonably foreseeable future." 55 Indeed, the
South Carolina attorney general suggested that it may be necessary to wait
until society was ready for desegregation-a change that might not occur

until "2015 or 2045."156
Notwithstanding the pleas of the NAACP, and the candor of some
state attorneys, the Justices were wary of issuing a firm decree. As other
scholars have recounted, the Justices worried that "[t]he more specific and
immediate the relief ordered, the greater the chances of defiance" by
segregationists. 57 And any such noncompliance would harm the Supreme
Court's public reputation. 58 As Justice Black put it during the internal
deliberations over the case, "[N] othing could injure the court more than
59
to issue orders that cannot be enforced."
Accordingly, the Court in Brown Hinstructed district courts to "enter
such orders . . . as are necessary and proper" to school systems to ensure
desegregation "with all deliberate speed." 60 To be sure, as Justin Driver
emphasizes, the Court's decision did not purport to authorize indefinite

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 508-09 (quoting Simon E. Sobeloff).
54. See J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School
Desegregation 16 (1961) (noting that the southern lawyers argued for a "wide-open
mandate" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55. Brown

IlTranscript,

supra note 48, at 420-21 (quoting Robert McCormick Figg).

56. Id. at 412 (quoting S.E. Rogers) (arguing that parts of South Carolina could not
easily "push the clock forward abruptly to 2015 or 2045").
57. Klarman, supra note 48, at 314; see also Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, The
Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 504,
505, 507 (2008) (arguing that Brown Ilillustrates how the Court may issue "vague" decrees
out of concern for the "institutional prestige" of the Court).
58. See Klarman, supra note 48, at 314 (noting "the justices' concern about issuing
futile orders" and how that could undermine "the Court's prestige").
59. Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 28, at 246 (quoting Justice Black and
other Justices concerned about noncompliance); see also Klarman, supra note 48, at 314
(recounting the Justices' internal deliberations).

60. Brown , 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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delays. 61 The Court declared that the lower courts should "require ... a
prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our [Brown]
ruling."62 Yet largely out of concern for the Court's sociological legitimacy,
the Justices declined to issue the firm deadline requested by the NAACP.
As Michael Karman observes, the Justices seemingly "valu[ed] the Court's
prestige-its dignity interest in avoiding the issuance of futile orders-over
the plaintiffs' constitutional rights[] ."6

.

2. Sacrificing Meaningful Change. - Many scholars have recognized
that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown II failed to produce
meaningful legal change.64 As Charles Ogletree laments, "the Court
removed much of the force of its [Brown] decision by allowing proponents
of segregation to end it not immediately but with 'all deliberate speed.' ..
This compromise left the decision flawed from the beginning. "65 Indeed,
even ten years after Brown, fewer than two percent of Black schoolchildren
attended integrated schools. 66 Derrick Bell thus forcefully charges:
"Having promised much in its first Brown decision, the Court in Brown II
said in effect that its landmark earlier decision was more symbolic than

real. "6
Brown II failed to achieve meaningful legal change in large part
because it delegated to the lower courts the task of defining "all deliberate
speed." And federal district judges implemented the ruling in vastly
different ways. In 1964, political scientist Kenneth Vines found what he
described as "extreme differences among the judges in the disposition of
race relations cases." 68 According to Vines, federal judges during this era

61. See Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court,
and the Battle for the American Mind 256-58 (2019) ("Brown II contained some
countervailing language, now generally forgotten, suggesting that the Court would not
countenance substantial delays .... "). Perhaps for that reason, Thurgood Marshall
suggested in private correspondence that he was satisfied with the Brown II decision. See
Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black

America's Struggle for Equality 749-50 (2d ed. 2004).
62. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
63. Klarman, supra note 48, at 314.
64. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against the Supreme Court 138-39 (2014)
(arguing that the Warren Court "deserves a good deal of the blame" for "racial segregation
in education" because "[t]he Court gave no deadlines or timetables[] [and] prescribed no
techniques or approaches to desegregating schools"); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown
to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978, at 126 (1979) (urging
that "southern school desegregation ran a most uneven course").
65. Charles J. Ogletree,Jr., All Deliberate Speed: Reflections on the First Half Century
of Brown v. Board of Education, at xiii (2004).
66. See Kluger, supra note 61, at 755.
67. Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled
Hopes for Racial Reform 19 (2004) [hereinafter Bell, Silent Covenants].
68. Kenneth N. Vines, Federal DistrictJudges and Race Relations Cases in the South,
26J. Pol. 337, 348 (1964). Notably, Vines did not focus exclusively on school desegregation
cases. But his findings are consistent with historical accounts about the implementation of
Brown during this era. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
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fell into three camps: "integrationists" who ruled in favor of most civil
rights claims, "segregationists" who rejected most such claims, and
"moderates" who fell between the other two extremes.69 In fact, according
to Vines, there were extremes within these camps: From 1954 to 1962, four
judges ruled for civil rights plaintiffs in more than ninety percent of cases,
while sevenjudges never granted relief to a single civil rights claimant. 70
Historical accounts corroborate these findings. Some judges
("integrationists") went to great lengths to make the Brown promise a
reality. Then-District Judge J. Skelly Wright, for example, "courageously
and imaginatively enforced" desegregation in New Orleans, Louisiana.71
By contrast, other judges ("segregationists") were openly hostile to
Brown.7 1 In Dallas, Texas,Judge T. Whitfield Davidson declined to "name
any date or issue any order" for desegregating the public schools, stating
that "the white man has a right to maintain his racial integrity and it can't
be done so easily in integrated schools." 73
The "all deliberate speed" formulation enabled segregationist judges
like Davidson to resist desegregation. But the lack of clarity in Brown Iwas
perhaps most problematic for judges in the moderate camp-the bulk of
the southernjudiciary. 74 Although these judges were less hostile to Brown,
they were reluctant to issue firm desegregation orders because they would
face severe repercussions from their local communities. As then-Professor
J. Harvie Wilkinson explained:
Brown II gave trial judges little to hide behind. The enormous
discretion of the trial judge in interpreting such language as
"prompt and reasonable start" and "all deliberate speed" made
his personal role painfully obvious. If the judge did more than
the bare minimum, he would be held unpleasantly accountable.
Bold movement meant community opprobrium. Segregationists
75
were always able to point to more indulgentjudges elsewhere.
Other commentators have offered a similar assessment. 76 In 1961,
political scientistJack Peltason argued that "[t] he directions of the United
69. See Vines, supra note 68, at 349.

70. See id. at 348-49.
71. Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice 272 (1977); see also Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes

112-35 (1981) (discussing Judge Wright's efforts).
72. See, e.g., Comment, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73 Yale L.J. 90, 9798 (1963) (describing how a Savannah federal judge "denied the requested injunctive relief
'solely on the basis' of a factual finding that ...
integrated schools were harmful to both
races").
73. Peltason, supra note 54, at 118-19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Judge Davidson); see also Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? 91 (paperback ed. 1993) (noting Judge Davidson's resistance to Brown).
74. See Peltason, supra note 54, at 8; infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
75. Wilkinson, supra note 64, at 80-81 (footnote omitted).
76. See Bell, Silent Covenants, supra note 67, at 19 ("The judge who, in trying to
enforce Brown, did more than the bare minimum, would be held unpleasantly accountable
by the very active, vocal, and powerful opposition that surrounded him."); see also Lawrence
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States Supreme Court" in Brown II were "not clear and explicit, and this
[was] the crucial problem." 77 Absent the cover of a clear higher court
decision, district judges who "issued antisegregation orders, however
mild," would be socially ostracized, receive threatening letters and anonymous and obscene phone calls, and likely need extra security. 78 Consider,
in this regard, the experience ofJudge Wright, who pushed for desegregation in New Orleans. The judge received death threats, witnessed a crossburning on his lawn, and needed an around-the-clock security detail. 79 As
Jack Bass puts it, "By the end of 1960, Skelly Wright had become the most
hated man in New Orleans . .. . With few exceptions, old friends would
step across the street to avoid speaking to him." 0
By contrast, a judge "who delay[ed] injunctions and avoid[ed] antisegregation rules" would be "a local hero."81 For many judges, the choice
was clear.82 According to Peltason, that is exactly what the southern state
attorneys hoped for in Brown II: "If they could persuade the Supreme
Court to leave the exact timing and precise nature of integration orders to
the discretion of southern federal judges, they knew they could operate
segregated schools for a long, long time."83
The courts of appeals could, of course, provide some guidance to

district judges. In 1967, Fifth Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom argued
that appellate courts had an obligation to step in: "District courts are ...
understandably loath" to issue desegregation orders "without firm
mandates" from higher courts. 84 Circuitjudges, Wisdom emphasized, "are
not more courageous or more enlightened than district judges. They are

Baum, Lower Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a Negative
Picture, 3 Just. Sys. J. 208, 214-15 (1978) (noting that southern judges "could suffer
opprobrium and isolation as a result of a perceived devotion to civil rights"); Michael W.

Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School Segregation, 37J.
Pol. 917, 918 (1975) (observing that "the district courts have not relished altering local
customs by judicial decree").
77. Peltason, supra note 54, at 13 (urging that southern district judges "can hardly be
expected on their own initiative to move against the local power structure").

78. Id. at 10.
79. See Bass, supra note 71, at 115 ("Pairs of federal marshals alternated in eight-hour
shifts at [Judge Wright's] home to ensure his physical safety, and they escorted him to and
from work.").

80. Id.
81. Peltason, supra note 54, at 9 (recounting that such a southern judge "will hear
himself referred to as one of the nation's 'great constitutional scholars"').
82. Many judges permitted delays or required at most "token compliance." Wilkinson,
supra note 64, at 81-82; see also Comment, supra note 72, at 99-100 ("Delay, and the ability
of district courts successfully to administer it, is at the heart of the problem in the Fifth
Circuit.").
83. Peltason, supra note 54, at 13; see also Rosenberg, supra note 73, at 89 (finding
that "Southern segregationists" fought to "vest control of civil rights in lower-courtjudges").
84. John Minor Wisdom, The Frictionmaking, Exacerbating Political Role of Federal

Courts, 21 Sw. L.J. 411, 420 (1967) (arguing that, "[t]o fill the vacuum" left by the Supreme
Court, "the circuit court must step in").
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just not on the firing line .... ."85 Judge Wisdom observed that the same
reasoning extended to his superiors: "The Supreme Court, almost wholly
removed from the local scene, by this criterion has an obligation to lead
or at least point out the logical line of development of the law." 86 But the
Court had failed to fulfill that function in school desegregation cases. 87
Accordingly, "because of the dearth of explicit directions ... from the
Supreme Court," the courts of appeals were "forced into a policy-making
position."88
There were, however, important differences among-and withinthe courts of appeals as well. Although several members of the Fifth
Circuit, including Judge Wisdom, were among "the most prominent
integrationists," other appellate judges were far more resistant to Brown.89
Fifth Circuit Judge Ben Cameron, for example, was known for his states'
rights philosophy and open hostility to desegregation and, on that basis,
became a "hero in Mississippi. "90
3. A More Contentious Appointments Process. - In the wake of Brown II,
Presidents and senators began to realize that the content of "all deliberate
speed" would depend tremendously on the composition of the inferior
federal bench. So political actors sought to ensure that a lower federal
court nominee would vote the "correct way" in civil rights cases. In this
post-Brown II era, we thus see the early seeds of the divisiveness that
characterizes our modern judicial selection process.
Notably, this focus on judicial ideology was a significant change. For
much of American history, lower federal court appointments were
patronage, not policymaking, opportunities. 91 Moreover, senators tended
to be in charge of this patronage: Under the norm of senatorial courtesy,
Presidents deferred to the wishes of home-state senators, at least when they
were from the same political party as the President.92 When both home-

85. Id. Notably, Congress has long required federal district judges to live in the district

to which they were appointed. See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 134, 62 Stat.
869, 896 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (2018)) (stating that, with few
exceptions, "[e]ach district judge ...

shall reside in the district or one of the districts for

which he is appointed").
86. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 420.
87. See id. at 420-21 (" [T]he general direction [of] 'all deliberate speed' has allowed
a wide variety of action at both the district court and appellate levels.").

88. Id. at 426-27.
89. Navasky, supra note 71, at 269 (noting that the Fifth Circuit contained a mix of
"integrationists," "moderates," and "segregationists"); see also Sheldon Goldman, Picking
Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through Reagan 126-31 (1997)
[hereinafter Goldman, Picking Federal Judges] (discussing the judges on the Fourth and

Fifth Circuits).
90. Bass, supra note 71, at 84-96.
91. See Steigerwalt, supra note 29, at 3; see also Scherer, supra note 29, at 13 (" [L]ower
courtjudgeships [were long] ... distributed to friends and campaign contributors .... ").
92. See Steigerwalt, supra note 29, at 4-5 ("Beginning with George Washington,
presidents deferred to [home-state] senators .... "). Senators took the lead with respect to
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state senators were from an opposing party, Presidents often turned to
other same-party state officials to suggest nominees. 93 To be sure, this
patronage system meant that Presidents usually selected individuals from
the same political party. But Presidents and senators rarely focused on how
lower court judges were likely to vote on specific legal issues.94
Moreover, in the mid-twentieth century, ajudge's partisan affiliation
did not say very much about how he9 5 might vote on high-profile issues like
desegregation. The Democratic and Republican parties were internally divided on civil rights; there were social progressives and social conservatives
in both parties. 96 Likely in part for that reason, Vines found that
"integrationist," "moderate," and "segregationist" judges were not neatly
divided along party lines.97
In the wake of "all deliberate speed," however, Presidents and
senators increasingly emphasized judicial ideology, at least with respect to
civil rights. The presidential administrations of the 1950s and 1960s largely
pushed for judges who would support integration. Although President
Eisenhower had a somewhat tepid attitude toward Brown,98 he largely
delegated judicial selection to his Justice Department, 99 and his Attorneys
not only district court but also most appellate court nominees; a seat on a regional circuit
court was seen as designated for a particular state. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges,
supra note 89, at 136.
93. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 135 (discussing how the
Eisenhower administration turned to Republican leaders in southern states, "which had no
Republican senators in the 1950s").

&

94. There were some notable exceptions. For example, after watching lower court
judges repeatedly strike down New Deal legislation, President Franklin Roosevelt paid closer
attention to which individuals were elevated to the inferior federal bench (although he was
still also guided by "more traditional party considerations"). Id. at 30-31; see also Binder
Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 33 (finding that, in the nineteenth century, political
actors sometimes noted a nominee's views on the Fugitive Slave Act).
95. This Essay uses the pronoun "he" because the patronage system almost entirely
excluded female nominees to the lower federal bench. See Goldman, Picking Federal
Judges, supra note 89, at 357.

96. See Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government 1 (2d ed. 1996) (observing that, by
1968 and 1972, the Democratic Party was still "hopelessly split" over civil rights); Keith E.
Whittington, Political Foundations ofJudicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court,

and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History 268-69, 273 (2007) [hereinafter Whittington,
Political Foundations] (noting that, by the mid-twentieth century, both parties had
"integrat[ed] disparate ideological elements ...
that persistently resisted the direction of
presidential and party leadership").
97. Interestingly, Vines found that Republican judges were "disproportionately among
the Moderates and Integrationists." Vines, supra note 68, at 350. He suggested that
Republican appointees may have been less keyed into the social circles of the South-and
thus less likely to care about social ostracism for supporting Brown. See id. at 351.
98. President Eisenhower's view of Brown is a matter of dispute. Compare 2 Stephen E.
Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President 190 (1984) ("Eisenhower personally wished that the
Court had upheld Plessy v. Ferguson.... "), with Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra
note 89, at 127 (arguing that Eisenhower later came to support Brown because he "believed
it was his duty to carry out the Court's rulings").
99. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 113, 123.
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General, Herbert Brownell and William Rogers, strongly supported
desegregation.10 0 President Kennedy had campaigned in part on a
platform of advancing civil rights,101 and both he and his successor Lyndon
Johnson endeavored to place integrationists on the bench. 102 Indeed, in
discussing lower court nominees, President Johnson would often direct
White House officials to "[c]heck to be sure he is all right on the Civil

Rights question. I'll approve him if he is."

103

Southern Democratic senators, however, also understood the
significance of the lower federal courts-and pushed for segregationists. 104
Victor Navasky writes that "the hard-core Southern Senators" emphasized
"the importance of 'not letting any more Skelly Wrights slip through.' "105
These divergent preferences set the stage for some challenging
judicial selection battles. Eisenhower officials had an important tactical
advantage because they were part of a Republican administration: The
Justice Department was not expected to defer completely to the recommendations of the uniformly Democratic southern senators. 106 But that
does not mean it was easy for the Eisenhower Administration to place
integrationists on the bench. 107 For example, Eisenhower officials gave the
100. See id. at 129-30; Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., Between Law and Politics: The Solicitor
General and the Structuring of Race, Gender, and Reproductive Rights Litigation 74-75

(2003).
101. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White
House 928-29 (1965). As a candidate, Kennedy did not support civil rights
wholeheartedly-in part because he worried about losing southern white Democratic votes.
See Steven Levingston, Kennedy and King: The President, the Pastor, and the Battle over
Civil Rights 99 (2017) (recounting that then-campaign manager Robert Kennedy was
concerned that an emphasis on civil rights would hurt Kennedy's support among southern
whites).
102. See Navasky, supra note 71, at 254 (urging that, had the matter been up to the
Kennedys, "undoubtedly no segregationists would have been appointed to the Southern
bench").
103. Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 170-71 ("President Johnson,
starting in mid-1966, insisted on knowing the civil rights view of candidates for the

judiciary.").
104. See Navasky, supra note 71, at 253-54, 258; Donald E. Campbell & Marcus E.
Hendershot, Show Me the Money: An Empirical Analysis of Interest Group Opposition to
Federal Courts of Appeals Nominees, 28 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 71, 81 (2018) (arguing that
were determined to keep control of the judges charged with
"Southern senators ...
enforcing" Brown).
105. Navasky, supra note 71, at 254, 258.
106. See Vines, supra note 68, at 351 (finding that Eisenhower could appoint judges in
the South with "relative freedom" because he was not "restricted by senatorial courtesy").
Eisenhower appointed several prominent supporters of integration, including Fifth Circuit
Judges John Minor Wisdom, Elbert Tuttle, and John Brown, and Alabama district court
Judge Frank Johnson, Jr. See Bass, supra note 71, at 19, 23-32, 245.
107. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 130-31 (recalling
Eisenhower's efforts to reassure a southern Democratic ally that past support for segregation
would not automatically disqualify candidates for appointment to the federal bench);
Peltason, supra note 54, at 5-6 (" [E]ven Eisenhower had to do business with the southern
Democrats .... ").
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green light to Mississippi Senator James Eastland's suggestion of Ben
Cameron for the Fifth Circuit, and he turned out to be a strong opponent
of Brown.108 And Democratic senators confirmed some integrationistssuch as Judge Wisdom in 1957-largely because their attitudes toward
Brown were uncertain. 109
The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations also struggled with lower
federal court appointments. These Democratic Presidents felt considerable pressure to defer to the preferences of home-state Democratic
senators, and thus-much to the chagrin of civil rights leaders-put some
segregationists on the federal bench.11 0 Kennedy, for example, went along
with Senator Eastland's insistence on District Judge W. Harold Cox, who
developed an "unmatched record" of "obstruct[ing] civil rights progress
in Mississippi.""' And when there was an opening on the Fifth Circuit,
Kennedy was strongly encouraged by progressives to nominate Judge
Wright in recognition of his brave work implementing Brown in New
Orleans.11 2 But Louisiana Senator Russell Long vetoed that option. 113
Kennedy instead nominated Judge Wright to the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit (a court without a home-state senator).114 Meanwhile, southern Democrats carefully scrutinized Kennedy's nominee to replace Judge
Wright in New Orleans: Frank Ellis.11 5 At a subcommittee hearing, Senator
Eastland pointedly asked, "Now, if we approve you, you are not going to
be another Skelly Wright, are you?"" 6
108. Navasky, supra note 71, at 265-66. Apparently, Senator Eastland had more
information about Cameron's views on civil rights. See Bass, supra note 71, at 84-86.
109. See Peltason, supra note 54, at 27-28.
110. See Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 166-72, 171 n.v (noting
that Johnson nominated an individual who "had signed the Southern Manifesto" and that
Kennedy too "appointed segregationist judges"); Navasky, supra note 71, at 243-76
(detailing and criticizing Kennedy's record); Claude Sitton, Robert Kennedy Backs Naming

of Segregationists to the Bench, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1963, at 9, https://nyti.ms/383EaES
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the "growing criticism from civil rights
advocates" of certain Kennedy appointees).
111. Bass, supra note 71, at 164-66. Kennedy officials later explained that Cox "was not
associated with . . . [specified] racist groups, and there was no public record of racist
speeches or activity." Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, supra note 89, at 167; see also
Navasky, supra note 71, at 250 (stating that Eastland likely told Cox not tojoin openly racist

groups).
112. See Navasky, supra note 71, at 272-73.

113. See id. at 273.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 275-76 (documenting Judge Ellis's confirmation process).
116. Nomination of Frank B. Ellis to Be United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Louisiana: Hearing Before Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong. 1, 7 (1962) (statement of Sen. Eastland). Judge Ellis was later confirmed and
proceeded to largely undo Judge Wright's desegregation order for New Orleans. A Fifth
Circuit panel (consisting of Judges John Minor Wisdom, Richard Rives, and John Robert
Brown) later reversed. See United Press Int'l, Federal Court Spurs Integration of New

Orleans Public Schools, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1962, at 1, 18, https://nyti.ms/3afXr8U (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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The post-Brown IIlower court selection process contains the seeds of
our modern-day era. To be sure, Presidents and senators focused on
ideology only with respect to civil rights. Otherwise, judicial selection
continued to be a patronage opportunity.1 1 7 But as to this crucial issue,
both sides-southern Democratic senators and pro-civil-rights presidential
administrations-were determined to put individuals with the "correct
views" on the lower federal courts. As a result, only those whose views on
desegregation were largely unknown seemed likely to receive a judicial
nomination. 118 As Peltason put it during this era: "Since 1954 any extreme
public position, even one for segregation, lowers a man's chances of being
elevated to the federal bench to near zero."19
B.

The Impact of the Undue Burden Standard
-

1. Background: Roe's Trimester Framework and the PoliticalResponse.
The Supreme Court's journey with respect to the right to terminate a
pregnancy differs in an important respect from the school desegregation
cases. When the issue came upon the federal judicial scene in Roe v.
Wade,120 abortion was not yet an issue of national political prominence. 121
And Justice Blackmun's majority opinion famously provided a broad, rulelike doctrine: the trimester framework. 122
Although some commentators criticized Roe for its prophylactic
character, many women's-rights advocates praised the Court's decision to
paint with a broad brush. 123 In 1973, some abortion-rights supporters
emphasized the contrast with the "all deliberate speed" formula, stating
that Roe "should be more immediately enforceable than the Brown

117. See Goldman, Picking FederalJudges, supra note 89, at 172 ("With the exception
of civil rights, neither Kennedy norJohnson appeared to view the courts as vehicles of public
policy relevant to their agendas. It is therefore not surprising to find that the policy agenda
played a relatively minor role in judicial selection."); Steigerwalt, supra note 29, at 3 (noting
that "[l]ower federal court nominations were traditionally patronage [] ... opportunities"
until the latter part of the twentieth century).
118. See Peltason, supra note 54, at 6-7; see also Goldman, Picking Federal Judges,
supra note 89, at 129, 167 (observing that presidential administrations tended to veto
individuals who had made publicly racist statements or joined pro-segregation

organizations).
119. Peltason, supra note 54, at 7.

120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
121. See Eva R. Rubin, Abortion, Politics and
94 (1987) (asserting that, until 1976, "abortion
politics"); Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial
Polarization, and the Consequences of Returning

the Courts: Roe v. Wade and Its Aftermath
had been a negligible issue in national
Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party
the Constitution to Elected Government,

69 Vand. L. Rev. 935, 948-49 (2016).
122. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (establishing a framework under which virtually all
regulation was invalid in the first trimester; restrictions were permitted to preserve maternal
health in the second trimester; and abortion could be restricted or banned in the third
trimester if there was an exception to protect maternal life and health).

123. See Rubin, supra note 121, at 63-64.
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decision was for racial desegregation."" The majority in Roe went "out of
its way to spell out the ground rules very clearly."1 25
In the wake of Roe v. Wade, however, the issue of abortion became one
of intense national importance. 126 The pro-life movement (which was only
nascent prior to Roe) became a powerful force in national politics, andjust
eight years after Roe, helped propel Ronald Reagan to the presidency.127
Reagan and his successor, George H.W. Bush, promised to nominate
judges "who respect[] ... the sanctity of innocent life." 128
2. The Creation of the Undue Burden Standard.- With the growth of the
pro-life movement, there was a push for another broad, rule-like approach
to abortion: a decision that would reverse Roe v. Wade and return the issue
to the legislatures of the fifty states. And when the Supreme Court heard
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, many onlookers believed that the Court would
do precisely that; after all, Reagan and Bush had placed five Justices on the

high bench. 129
As it turns out, the Justices did come close to overruling Roe. Chief
Justice Rehnquist drafted an "Opinion of the Court" that would have
subjected abortion regulations to rational basis review.130 But late in the

124. Janice Goodman, Rhonda Copelon Schoenbrod & Nancy Stearns, Doe and Roe:
Where Do We Go from Here?, 1 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 20, 27, 29 (1973) (footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Janice Goodman; then quoting Rhonda
Copelon Schoenbrod); see also Rubin, supra note 121, at 63-64.
125. Goodman et al., supra note 124, at 27 (quotingJanice Goodman).
126. See Rubin, supra note 121, at 89-113 (recounting how Roe became a subject of
national controversy); Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 16-21, 143-47
(1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Clash] (urging that Roe helped "galvanize a right-to-life

movement"); Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 817,851-52 (2013).
For a forceful argument that Roe was only one of several factors that led to the political
escalation over abortion, see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before Roe v. Wade: Voices
that Shaped the Abortion Debate Before the Supreme Court's Ruling 256-59 (2010).

127. See Tribe, Clash, supra note 126, at 16-17.
128. Scherer, supra note 29, at 57-58 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting

1980 Republican Party Platform, in 2 The Encyclopedia of the Republican Party 660, 688
(George Thomas Kuran &Jeffrey D. Schultz eds., 1997); then quoting 1988 Republican
Party Platform, in 2 The Encyclopedia of the Republican Party, supra, at 741, 755).
129. See Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun's Supreme
Court Journey 197-200 (2005) (arguing that, "[w] ith the new makeup of the Court"-the
replacement of Justices Brennan and Marshall with Souter and Thomas-"Roe had never
looked so imperiled"); Mary Ziegler, Abortion and the Law in America: Roe v. Wade to the
Present 94 (2020) ("After Anthony Kennedy took a seat on the Court, it seemed that the
justices would overrule Roe."); Sullivan, Justices, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that many
observers expected the Court to "gut the abortion right").
130. See Greenhouse, supra note 129, at 203 (describing the otherJustices' reactions to
Rehnquist's twenty-seven-page draft); Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1665, 1698 (2013) (recounting that Justice Blackmun "was convinced that
Roe was doomed when a court majority led by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appeared
ready to effectively overrule Roe" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fred
Barbash, Blackmun's Papers Shed Light into Court: Justice's Trove Opened by Library of
Congress, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 2004, at Al-A12 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review))).

Justice
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deliberations, Justice Kennedy (who had sided with the Chief Justice at
conference) switched his vote. 131 Kennedy then, along with Justices
O'Connor and Souter, authored a joint opinion, which purported to
reaffirm Roe-with some important modifications.
The Casey joint opinion makes clear that the Justices declined to
overrule Roe v. Wade in large part out of concern for the Supreme Court's
sociological legitimacy. 132 The Justices recognized that there was a
powerful pro-life movement urging the rejection of Roe. 133 But they
insisted: "[T] o overrule under fire" would "subvert the Court's legitimacy
beyond any serious question" because it would seem that the Court had
"surrender[ed] to political pressure." 134 Accordingly, the Court had to
stand firm:
[P]ressure to overrule the [Roe v. Wade] decision, like pressure
to retain it, has grown only more intense. A decision to overrule
Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would
address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and
unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the
Nation's commitment to the rule of law. 135
As the ACLU attorneys in Casey later observed, "pro-choice
mobilization may have .. . impacted the Court's decision to spare Roe." 136
In the months leading up to Casey, advocates had warned that a reversal of
Roe would harm the Court's external legitimacy-by suggesting that the

131. See Greenhouse, supra note 129, at 203-05 (noting that, "suddenly, everything
changed," but not speculating as to why Justice Kennedy switched his vote); see also Jeffrey
Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court 52-53 (2007) (discussing
Kennedy's "dramatic switch").
132. Many scholars have commented on this aspect of the decision. See, e.g., Or Bassok,

The Supreme Court's New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 153, 186 (2013)
(finding that Casey "included an explicit and rare admission that public opinion ... as well
as public confidence in the Court affected the decision"); Barry Friedman, The Importance

of Being Positive: The Nature and Function ofJudicial Review, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257, 1302
(2004) (" [I]t seems hard to gainsay that the [Casey] plurality understood that the eyes of
the public were on them, and that they acted accordingly."); Hellman, supra note 25, at
1117 ("Recognizing a level of public distrust about the principled character of Supreme
Court opinions, the plurality [in Casey] argues that the Court must attend to its appearance
in order to preserve its ability to be effective.").

133. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) ("Whether or not a new social consensus is
developing on that issue [of personal choice to undergo abortion], its divisiveness is no less
today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has
grown only more intense.").

134. Id. at 866-67.
135. Id. at 869.
136. Linda J. Wharton & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving Roe v. Wade ...

When You Win

Only Half the Loaf, 24 Stan. L. &Pol'y Rev. 143, 154 (2013). Pro-choice advocates apparently
took the issue to the Court in 1992 so that, if the Court were to overrule Roe v. Wade, it would
do so in an election year. See Greenhouse, supra note 129, at 201.
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Justices "would allow their political views to dictate the outcome of their
decisions."137
Yet the Justices also did not reaffirm Roe in full. Importantly, the joint
opinion dispensed with what it described as "the rigid trimester framework
of Roe v. Wade" and substituted a new test: the undue burden standard. 13
State regulations of abortion prior to viability would be permissible, as long
as they did not impose an "undue burden" on the right to terminate a

pregnancy. 139
It is curious-particularly after the joint opinion's emphasis on stare
decisis 1 40-that the joint opinion dispensed with the trimester framework.
Although the Justices likely crafted the undue burden standard for various
reasons,"4 some commentators suggest that one central concern was the
Court's sociological legitimacy.14 2 Robert Post and Reva Siegel, for
example, view the undue burden test as an effort "to respond to both sides
of the abortion dispute by fashioning a constitutional law in which each
side can find recognition." 143 The flexible undue burden standard would
be more acceptable because it would better balance the concerns of the
pro-life and pro-choice communities. 144 Under this view, Casey turns out to
be a "Janus-faced holding": While the joint opinion insisted in its stare
decisis discussion "on the independence of law"-and thus refused to

137. Wharton & Kolbert, supra note 136, at 154.

138. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
139. See id. at 874-78; see also Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion and
Precedent, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 308, 315 (2020) ("Casey's fidelity to Roe was selective .... ").

140. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69.
141. The authors of the joint opinion had a general (albeit not universal) preference
for standards over rules. See Sullivan, Justices, supra note 1, at 90-91. But see New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (showing that all three Justices favored a rule
prohibiting Congress from "commandeer[ing]" state legislatures). Justice O'Connor had
suggested an "undue burden" standard in previous cases. But the test in Casey differed in
important respects from O'Connor's earlier formulation. See Gillian E. Metzger, Note,
Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional

Jurisprudence,

94 Colum. L. Rev. 2025, 2036 (1994) (noting the differences).
142. See Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 Emory L.J. 481, 532-33 (2002) (arguing

that, to protect "the nation's confidence in itsjudiciary," the "center of the Court" opted to
"affirm[] ...
a woman's right to choose" but also "walk[] away from the ...
trimester
framework" and "substitute ...
the undue burden standard"); Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 42730 (2007) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Roe Rage] (urging that Casey "subjects law to
democratic pressure by dismantling the trimester system of Roe"); see also Neil S. Siegel,

The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 959, 976, 1028-29 (2008) (arguing
that the "'undue-burden standard' ...
reflected the plurality's belief that Roe did not
sufficiently validate" anti-abortion concerns).
143. Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 142, at 429.
144. This reading finds support in the joint opinion, which asserted that the new test
better "reconcil[ed] the State's interest [in protecting potential life] with the woman's
constitutionally protected liberty." Casey, 505 U.S. at 874, 876.
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overrule Roe "under fire"-it also "subject[ed] law to democratic pressure
by dismantling the trimester system of Roe." 145
3. Casey and the Lower CourtSelection Process. - The Supreme Court in
Casey not only failed to provide the legal change sought by pro-life
advocates but also declined to retain the broad, rule-like formula of Roe.
For that reason, Casey had an important but seemingly unanticipated
impact: It granted considerable discretion to the inferior federal courts to
determine what qualified as an "undue burden" on the right to terminate
a pregnancy-and thereby put tremendous pressure on the lower court
selection process.
Notably, Casey came upon the legal scene at a time when Presidents,
senators, and interest groups were already beginning to focus more on
lower court selection. As discussed, through the 1950s and 1960s, outside
the context of civil rights, such appointments remained largely an
opportunity for political patronage. 146 The Reagan Administration,
however, started a new trend. 147 Beginning in 1980, Reagan emphasized
judicial ideology across several issue areas-including abortion, school
prayer, and the use of busing to desegregate schools-and at all levels of
the federaljudiciary. 148 Both Reagan and his successor, George H.W. Bush,
promised "the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who
1 49
respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent life."
By the end of Reagan's first term, progressive interest groups were
paying more attention to lower court selection-and pushing like-minded
senators to oppose some nominees. 150 Senators began using procedural
tools, such as the blue slip, informal holds, and even the filibuster, to
block-or at a minimum delay-certain nominations. 151 Senator Ted
Kennedy, for example, sought to filibuster J. Harvie Wilkinson's
nomination to the Fourth Circuit, calling him "the least qualified nominee

145. Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 142, at 429-30; see also id. at 430 ("Casey
illustrates how a constitutional decision can be politically responsive at the same time as it
affirms a commitment to the law/politics distinction.").
146. See supra section II.A.3.
147. The Carter Administration inadvertently paved the way for this trend. President
Carter sought to replace the patronage system with a merit-based system that would enable
more women and minorities to join the federal bench. But in so doing, Carter centralized
judicial selection in the White House. See Goldman, Picking FederalJudges, supra note 89,

at 11 n.i, 360.
148. See id. at 2; Scherer, supra note 29, at 161.
149. Scherer, supra note 29, at 160-61 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 1980 Republican Party Platform, in 2 The Encyclopedia of the
Republican Party, supra note 128, at 660, 688).
150. See Steigerwalt,

supra note 29, at 11

(finding that, "[a]fter

witnessing the

presidential shift from patronage to political appointments" under Reagan, progressive
activists "transferred their attention to lower court confirmations" and formed judicial

watchdog groups").
151. See Binder & Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 56.
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ever submitted for an appellate court vacancy." 15 Although most
nominees were still confirmed, the temperature of the process was clearly

rising. 153
The Supreme Court's decision in Casey added fuel to this growing fire.
As many scholars have recognized, inferior federal courts applied the
undue burden standard in markedly different-and often ideologically
predictable-ways. 15 4 Although some studies suggest that, prior to 1990,
there was little difference in the way that Democratic- and Republicanappointed jurists approached abortion cases, 155 scholars have observed
"powerful evidence of ideological voting" in abortion cases beginning in
the 1990s.156 Political scientist Nancy Scherer found that, between 1994
and 2001, a Democratic-appointed lower court judge was more likely to
strike down an abortion restriction "by 44 percentage points compared

with a Republican-appointed judge. "157
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's "undue burden" test raised the
stakes for lower court appointments. 158 As Scherer recounts, prominent
152. 130 Cong. Rec. 21,590 (1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also Scherer, supra
note 29, at 148 (noting that the Wilkinson nomination was the first "use of the filibuster to
keep lower court judges off the bench on ideological grounds").
153. The overall confirmation rate was still high. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal,

Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments 75-76 (2005) (finding that
"[t]he vast majority (about four out of every five)" of federal judicial nominees are "rather
handily confirmed"). But there were more battles and delays. See Scherer, supra note 29, at
2-3, 136 (finding that "the percentage ... not confirmed" "increased dramatically ... in the
George H.W. Bush administration" and that the average days between nomination and
confirmation increased tenfold from around thirty during the Carter Administration to over
300 during the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations).

&

154. See Karen A. Jordan, The Emerging Use of a Balancing Approach in Casey'sUndue
Burden Analysis, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 657, 660 (2015) (describing the lower courts'
"variable and difficult to reconcile results"); see also Linda J. Wharton, Susan Frietsche
Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 18

Yale J.L. & Feminism 317, 353, 355-56 (2006) (finding "mixed results" in lower court
challenges to abortion restrictions).
155. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman & Andres Sawicki, Are

Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the FederalJudiciary 92-93 (2006) ("It is striking
to see that between 1971 and 1990 there are no party effects [in abortion cases]: Democratic

appointees cast a pro-choice vote 62 percent of the time, and Republican appointees do so
58 percent of the time.").
156. Id. at 93; see also Scherer, supra note 29, at 41 (finding that Democratic-appointed
judges are "less likely to vote to uphold an abortion restriction by 44 percentage points
compared with a Republican-appointed judge"); Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Are
Commercial Speech Cases Ideological? An Empirical Inquiry, 25 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.

827, 830, 842, 861 (2017) [hereinafter Samaha & Germano, Commercial Speech] (finding,
from 2008 to 2016, "a significant degree ofjudicial disagreement over abortion policy," with
"[g]aps of more than twenty-five percent").
157. Scherer, supra note 29, at 41.
158. See id. at 19-20 (finding increased attention to lower court decisions among prochoice activists after Casey); Devins, supra note 121, at 989 (" [F]ederal courts of appeal have
divided over the . . . undue burden standard . . .. [I] t is little wonder that partisans on the
Senate Judiciary Committee now fight tooth and nail over ... nominations....").
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interest groups recognized that, after Casey, "all important legal issues in
the pro-choice/pro-life debate are being decided" by the inferior federal
judiciary.159 Some pro-choice groups thus scrutinized every lower court
nominee-and castigated President Clinton in the 1990s when he
considered placing a pro-life individual on the federal district court
bench.160 A legal director of NARAL Pro-Choice America, an advocacy and
lobbying organization, put the point candidly:
There's a real recognition that the lower court judges hold vast
power over women's reproductive lives .... Casey, in 1992 ...
empowered lower court judges because it established an undue
burden standard ... which is obviously a mushier standard [than
the test in Roe], and more fact dependent and subject to the
interpretations of district and court of appeals judges. 161
Put another way, "because of the dearth of explicit directions ... from the
Supreme Court," the lower courts are "forced into a policy-making
position" on the scope of the right to terminate a pregnancy. 16 2
III. TRADEOFFS WITHIN THEJUDICIAL HIERARCHY

Brown II and Casey vividly illustrate the conundrum faced by the
federal judiciary in high-profile contexts. Although the Supreme Court
could constrain lower court judges through broad, rule-like precedents, 163
the Justices may be reluctant to do so in salient areas. They may instead
craft more open-ended tests, leaving the details to be ironed out by the
inferior federal judiciary. Presidents, senators, and interest groups then
zero in on the composition of the lower courts-in ways that threaten the
long-term legitimacy of the inferior federal bench. This Part argues that
these legitimacy tradeoffs are a significant (albeit largely overlooked)
feature of our federal judicial scheme.
A.

Can Supreme Court Precedent Constrain?

At the outset, this Essay addresses a preliminary question: Could the
Supreme Court constrain inferior federal judges in high-profile cases? As
scholars have observed, the Justices can often more effectively oversee
their judicial inferiors by articulating broad, rule-like doctrines. 16 4 But this
159. Scherer, supra note 29, at 19.
160. See id. at 17, 63, 123 (" [L]iberal activists let [Clinton] ... know there would be no
free rides when it comes to lifetime appointment to the bench.").
161. Id. at 19-20 (quoting Interview by Nancy Scherer with Elizabeth Cavendish, former

Legal Dir., NARAL Pro-Choice Am., in Washington, D.C. (July 10, 2002)).
162. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 426-27.
163. See infra section IIlA.
164. See infra notes 170-176 and accompanying text; see also Andrew Coan, Rationing
the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making 23-26
(2019) ("Clear rules also promote uniformity among lower-court decisions, reducing the
need for Supreme Court review to achieve this end."); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural
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Essay contends that such formalistic doctrines are particularly crucial in
high-profile and contested areas. It is reasonable to assume that lower
court judges, like people generally, often have strong views on salient
issues, such as abortion, affirmative action, or gun rights. Accordingly, the
Justices likely have greater need in these areas to rein in their judicial
inferiors-and limit the impact of ideology in lower court decisionmaking.
And the available evidence suggests that the Justices can do so: Given the
norms of our judicial practice, lower federal courts will obey broad, rulelike Supreme Court precedents, even in high-profile cases.

1. The Legal Obligation and Norms of Constraint. - Legal scholars
5
overwhelmingly agree that Article III creates a hierarchical judiciary,6
such that the inferior federal courts are bound by the Supreme Court's
articulation of federal law.166 But do inferior federal courts in fact aim to
comply with the edicts of their judicial superiors? Existing research
strongly indicates that the answer is yes.
As political scientist John Kastellec has observed, empirical studies
have repeatedly found "widespread compliance by lower courts" with
Supreme Court precedents. 167 That research accords with the declarations

Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 3, 40-50 (2009) [hereinafter Grove,
Vertical Maximalism] (arguing that, since the modern Court reviews only a fraction of lower
court decisions, it can most effectively guide itsjudicial inferiors through broad precedents);
Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Discretionary Dockets, 31 Const. Comment. 221,
222-25 (2016) (urging that the Court could issue broad precedents in some contexts and
supervise others on a case-by-case basis); cf. Maggie Gardner, Abstention at the Border, 105

Va. L. Rev. 63, 90-93 (2019) (offering a thoughtful analysis of doctrinal design).
165. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 Va. L. Rev.

647, 668-69 & n.92 (1996); Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme
Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 324, 362 (2006); James E. Pfander,Jurisdiction-Stripping and the
Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1453 (2000).
But see David E. Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple "Supreme"
Courts, 66 Ind. L.J. 457, 503-04 (1991) (contending that the Constitution does not require
a hierarchical judiciary).
166. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum.

L. Rev. 1002, 1032-33 (2007); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior
Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 829 n.49, 832-34 (1994); Charles Fried,
Impudence, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 155, 189-90; Ryan C. Williams, Lower Court Originalism
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3847891 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing
Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's JusticeAccused, 7J.L. & Religion
33, 82-88 (1989) (suggesting that lower courts can disregard "clearly erroneous" decisions);
Richard M. Re, Precedent as Permission, 99 Tex. L. Rev. 907, 938 (2021) (arguing that
purportedly mandatory aspects of stare decisis "do not constrain" to the extent that they are
"merits-sensitive").

167. John P. Kastellec, The Judicial Hierarchy, Oxford Rsch. Encyc. of Pol. (Jan. 25,
2017), https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/
acrefore-9780190228637-e-99 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (providing an overview
of the literature).
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of lower court judges themselves. 168 Federal judges have asserted that they
have a "constitutional obligation" to "apply whatever decisions the
[Supreme] Court issues." 169
2. The Theory: The Constraining Impact of Rules. - Not all Supreme
Court precedent constrains in the same way, however. Lower courts have
far more discretion in applying legal doctrines that take the form of
standards rather than rules.17 0 For that reason, some political scientists
argue that the Justices should use rules, rather than standards, if they
anticipate that lower court judges will be reluctant to carry out their
superiors' commands. 171
Legal scholars have also asserted that the Supreme Court can more
effectively constrain its judicial inferiors through broad, rule-like
doctrines, such as Miranda v. Arizona,172 one-person, one-vote,1 73 or the

168. See Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" ofJudging:

Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 619, 622 (1985) (" [T]he
lower courts ... are bound to follow Supreme Court rulings .... "); see also J. Woodford
Howard, Courts of Appeals in the FederalJudicial System: A Study of the Second, Fifth, and
District of Columbia Circuits 156 (1981) (finding, based on interviews, that judges "felt
obliged to obey the Supreme Court").
169. Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the HarrisCase,

102 Yale L.J. 205, 206 (1992).

&

170. See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of
Legal Interpretation 68 (2006) ("Rules and standards allocate decisionmaking authority in
different ways . . . between different levels of a hierarchical institution .... "); Scott Baker

Pauline T. Kim, A Dynamic Model of Doctrinal Choice, 4J. Legal Analysis 329, 333, 336-37
(2012) (" [T]he more rule-like the doctrine, the more likely it is that the lower courts will
follow the directive .... "); Jeffrey R. Lax, Political Constraints on Legal Doctrine: How

Hierarchy Shapes the Law, 74J. Pol. 765, 766 (2012) (arguing that "a bright-line rule" is
more likely to "prevent strategic non-compliance"); see also Richard M. Re, Narrowing
Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 Geo. L.J. 921, 924-26 (2016) (discussing how
"ambiguous Supreme Court precedents" offer lower courts "interpretive flexibility"). For a
sample of the vast literature on rules and standards, see Frederick Schauer, Playing by the
Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 159
(1991) (offering an in-depth comparison of rules and standards and emphasizing how rules
can "operate as tools for the allocation of power" among individuals and institutions
(emphasis omitted)); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42

Duke L.J. 557, 562-63, 601 (1992) (defining "[a] legal command ...

to be rule-like to the

extent that greater effort has been expended ex ante, rather than requiring such effort to be
made ex post").
171. See Frank Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, A Positive Political Theory of
Rules and Standards, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 26 ("[A] rule ... constrains lower courtjudges
who hold antithetical policy preferences more than a standard would."); Lax, supra note
170, at 772 (arguing that "[t]he greater the likelihood of conflict" between a higher court
and a lower court, "the greater the desirability of the bright-line rule").

172. 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (holding that police must inform individuals of
certain specified rights before beginning a custodial interrogation); see also Grove, Vertical
Maximalism, supra note 164, at 55-56 (noting that Miranda "created a broad prophylactic
rule" to protect the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).

173. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (establishing the one-person, onevote rule for legislative apportionment).
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tiers of scrutiny. 174 Toby Heytens contends, for example, that the Supreme
Court can use rules to ensure that its handiwork "can and will be faithfully
implemented" by lower courtjudges. 175 By contrast, "complicated or openended standards increase the risk of good faith misunderstandings and
create opportunities for disguising deliberate noncompliance." 176
These assumptions presumably motivated then-NAACP attorney
Thurgood Marshall to request a firm deadline for desegregation. Marshall
anticipated that "the Negro in this country would be in a horrible shape"
if the Court left the "enforcement of [Brown] ... to the judgment of the
district court with practically no safeguards." 77 But despite this request,
the Supreme Court articulated the "all deliberate speed" test. As Fifth
Circuit Judge Wisdom commented (with some understatement), that test
gave "the inferior federal courts . . . a greater latitude for action," and "[i]t
has not worked out well." 178
3. EmpiricalSupport. - Some empirical evidence supports the assumption that broad, rule-like doctrines constrain inferior federal court judges
to a greater degree than standards, even in high-profile contexts. Recall,
for example, that scholars have found "no party effects" in abortion cases
decided by the lower courts prior to 1990 but have uncovered "powerful

&

174. See Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a HierarchicalJudiciary, 14 Geo. J.L.
Pub. Pol'y 475, 476-77 (2016) (defending the tiers as a way to oversee lower courts); see also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63

U. Colo. L. Rev. 293, 295-96 (1992) ("[T]he Court has attempted to limit its own freedom
to balance in many areas by employing fixed 'tiers' of review. The Court ties itself to the twin
masts of 'strict scrutiny' and 'rationality review' precisely in order to resist the siren song of
the sliding scale."). To be sure, the tiers of scrutiny do not always operate in a rule-like
fashion. Intermediate scrutiny, after all, is a balancing test, and the Court has at times
applied a weakened strict scrutiny standard or heightened rational basis review. See Suzanne

B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 482 (2004); see also Adam
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 795-96 (2006) (asserting, based on an empirical study,
that "strict scrutiny is survivable in fact"); infra notes 187, 194-196, and accompanying text
(noting that the Court has applied a more relaxed "strict scrutiny" standard in the
affirmative action context). But in many cases, the tiers of scrutiny provide lower courts with
considerable guidance. Indeed, one of the most common criticisms of the tiers of scrutiny
is that they are far too rigid. See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion?

American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 Emory L.J. 797, 799-801 (2011)
(commenting that the American system of tiered review "limits the flexibility of judges");
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of

Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 161, 182 (1984) (arguing that the tiered system "always has been
and always will be an overly rigid structure"); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law

in an Age of Proportionality, 124 Yale L.J. 3094, 3097, 3152 (2015) (advocating "a fresh look
at proportionality" and suggesting that "whether a classification violates equal protection
should depend not on rigid ex ante categories"). To the extent the goal is to guide lower
courts, that very rigidity is a virtue.
175. Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2045,

2046 (2008) (emphasis omitted).
176. Id. at 2048.
177. Brown IITranscript, supra note 48, at 400 (quoting Thurgood Marshall).
178. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 420.
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evidence of ideological voting" in abortion cases after that time.179 That is,
since the 1990s, lower court judges appointed by either Republican or
Democratic Presidents vote in distinct ways. 180 There may be multiple reasons for this difference, but one likely factor is the Supreme Court's shift
from the rule-like trimester framework of Roe v. Wade to the undue burden
standard of Casey.181 As political scientist Sheldon Goldman observed in
1989, "The most anti-abortion Reagan [lower court] appointee [had to]
follow Roe v. Wade until it [was] modified or overturned by the Supreme
Court itself."182
One can also see the constraining impact of broad, rule-like doctrines
in administrative law (an area that, as discussed below, 183 has grown in
political salience). A recent study by Kent Barnett, Christina Boyd, and
Christopher Walker looks at Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense
Council, Inc., which directs lower courts to defer to a federal agency's
reasonable construction of an ambiguous federal statute. 18 4 The authors
find that Chevron "powerfully, even if not fully, constrain[s] ideology in
judicial decisionmaking. When applying Chevron, panels of all ideological
stripes use the framework similarly and reveal modest ideological
behavior. "185 This study supports Peter Strauss's earlier assessment that
Chevron "can be seen as a device for managing the courts of appeals that

179. Sunstein et al., supra note 155, at 92-93.
180. There are, of course, different measures ofjudicial "ideology." This discussion relies on one common metric: the party of the nominating President. See Samaha & Germano,
Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 830 (noting that this is a "standard metric"). This
metric seems most likely to impact the judicial selection process.
181. One might assume that the difference relates to changes within the Republican
and Democratic parties. Until the 1990s, there was no clear split between Democrats and
Republicans on the abortion issue. See Devins, supra note 121, at 947-48, 966. But whatever
the views of the party base, Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush consciously sought to
nominate pro-life judges to the federal bench in the 1980s. See supra notes 128, 149, and
accompanying text. Accordingly, one might have expected to see some ideological voting
from those judges. The fact that ideological voting appears later suggests that the change
relates to shifts in Supreme Court doctrine.
182. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan'sJudicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing
Up, 72Judicature 318, 328 (1989) [hereinafter Goldman, Reagan] (footnote omitted).
183. See infra section IV.A.

184. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984); Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher

J.

Walker, Administrative Law's

Political Dynamics, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 1463, 1467-68 (2018) (examining 1,382 published
opinions from 2003 through 2013).
185. Barnett et al., supra note 184, at 1467-68. Earlier studies offered a more mixed
assessment of the impact of Chevron (although it appears that those studies were less
comprehensive than that of Barnett et al.). See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of

Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155, 2166-67 (1998) (surveying the literature and noting that the
first studies found significant constraint, while later studies found less).
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can reduce (although not eliminate) the Supreme Court's need to police
their decisions for accuracy.116
By contrast, empirical scholarship has found that lower court judges
vote in more predictable "conservative" or "progressive" directions in
certain high-profile contexts-involving affirmative action, 187 abortion
(since the 1990s),188 and (increasingly) the Second Amendment.1 89 In
each of these areas, the Supreme Court has articulated opaque doctrines
that offer inferior federal courts considerable leeway. As we have seen, the
undue burden test governs abortion cases.190 In the Second Amendment
context, although the Court in 2008 and 2010 declared that the
Constitution protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms,191 the
Court has said very little about what that right means. The Justices have
repeatedly denied certiorari in gun rights cases and have declined to
articulate any tiers of scrutiny for Second Amendment claims. 192 As
Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Sykes put it, the Supreme Court has not
"give [n] us any doctrine about ...
how to reconcile conflicts between

186. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev.

1093, 1121 (1987).
187. See Sunstein et al., supra note 155, at 24-25 (finding "striking evidence of
ideological voting" on affirmative action); Samaha & Germano, Commercial Speech, supra
note 156, at 830, 842, 861 (finding "[g]aps of more than twenty-five percent" in judicial
ideology scores for affirmative action cases from 2008 to 2016).
188. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 153, at 128-29, 133 (finding that "Democrats are
far more likely to cast pro-choice votes (70 percent) than Republicans (49 percent)");
Scherer, supra note 29, at 41 (finding that Democratic-appointed judges are "less likely to
vote to uphold an abortion restriction by 44 percentage points compared with a Republicanappointed judge"); Samaha & Germano, Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 827, 830,

842 (finding significant gaps in judicial ideology scores between 2008 and 2016).
189. See Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Judicial Ideology Emerges, At Last, in

Second Amendment Cases, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 315, 319-20, 325-26, 341 (2018)
[hereinafter Samaha & Germano, Judicial Ideology] ("[T]he party of the appointing
president is now predictive of judge votes in civil gun rights cases."). In an earlier study
(from 2008 to 2016), Adam Samaha and Roy Germano found no ideological divide; judges
of all stripes tended to deny Second Amendment claims. See Samaha & Germano,
Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 860-61 (finding no statistical significance between
the judicial ideology of judges on gun rights claims). But in an updated study, the authors
found a difference-apparently because Democratic appointees over time became less likely
to support gun rights claims. Samaha & Germano, Judicial Ideology, supra, at 319-20, 325-

26, 341.
190. See supra section II.B.3; see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin,
Abortion: A Woman's Private Choice, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1189, 1220 (2017) (observing that
Casey "offers no guidance as to which laws are an undue burden and which are not").

191. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (ruling that the Second
Amendment is applicable to states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635-36
(2008) (finding a right to possess a handgun in the home for purposes of self-defense).
192. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (concluding that a prohibition on handguns in the
home fails "[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny"); infra note 211 and accompanying
text (noting the certiorari denials); see also infra note 218 (noting a grant of certiorari in
one recent case).
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Second Amendment gun rights and the public's right to regulation of
dangerous instrumentalities."193
With respect to affirmative action, the Court has suggested that lower
courts should apply a significantly more relaxed strict scrutiny standard
than appears in other areas of constitutional law,194 allowing public universities to consider race as one factor in admissions, as long as they stay away
from quotas or other sharp numerical measures. 19 5 As Adam Samaha and
Roy Germano observe in an empirical study (which found ideological voting in lower court affirmative action cases), the uncertain "doctrinal
messages" in the Supreme Court's affirmative action precedents "make
room in law for disagreements in practice. "196
4. The Potential Value of Constraint. - The available evidence thus
suggests that the Justices could constrain their judicial inferiors by issuing
broad, rule-like legal tests. Notably, the need for such doctrines is more
pressing for the modern Supreme Court than it was in the past. In our
modern judicial system, the Court has expansive discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction and hears only a small fraction of federal question cases that
arise in the lower federal courts. 197 Meanwhile, the lower courts have
193. Diane Sykes, CircuitJudge, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Seventh Cir., Remarks at Public

Understanding and Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, at 2:45:50-2:47:48 (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://law-media.marquette.edu/Mediasite/Play/38960cec7b224ffebc49ad811eba83891d (on
file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).

194. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003) (noting that "[n]ot every
decision influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to
provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons
advanced by the governmental decisionmaker"); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,

631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza,

J.,

concurring), vacated, 570 U.S. 297 (2013)

(finding that Grutter"applied a level of scrutiny markedly less demanding" than traditional
strict scrutiny); Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 145, 166 (noting Grutter's "alteration of...
strict scrutiny").

195. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherI), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214-15 (2016)
(upholding a program that considered race as one factor); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37, 343-

44 (same); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72, 275-76 (2003) (striking down
an undergraduate program that "automatically distribute [d] 20 points to every single

applicant from an 'underrepresented minority' group").
196. Samaha & Germano, Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 846.

197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2018) (granting the Supreme Court broad discretionary
certiorari jurisdiction); see also John G. Roberts, Jr., 2019 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary 5-6 (2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2019yearendreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QMF-7DMF]
(reporting that the Supreme Court
decided sixty-nine cases in the 2018 term, while also noting that, between September 2018
and September 2019, there were 48,486 filings in the lower federal courts of appeals,
297,877 filings in the federal district courts, and 776,674 filings in bankruptcy courts). The
Court would face capacity constraints, even if it reinvigorated an alternative process for
review: certification by the lower federal courts. For a discussion of certification, see Amanda
L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court's Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 1310, 1312, 1319-26 (2010) (suggesting that "the certification of issues by
lower federal courts to the Supreme Court-a practice that dates back almost as far as the
federal courts themselves, but one that is now largely a 'dead letter'-deserves a good
dusting off' (footnote omitted) (quoting Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some
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mandatoryjurisdiction; accordingly, they cannot decline to hear a case, no
matter how controversial. 198 Thus, as Judge Sykes stated, those courts
cannot "duck the hard Second Amendment case .... We need to decide
"t,,199

it.""

In this environment, the Supreme Court cannot oversee the inferior
federaljudiciary simply by correcting errors in specific cases.200 The Court
must articulate doctrines that will help guide the lower courts in the many
cases that the high Court cannot review. This Essay assumes that, in some
contexts, the Justices may provide sufficient guidance to their judicial
inferiors through open-ended standards. But in high-profile and contested
areas-such as abortion, affirmative action, and gun rights-the Justices
have good reason to use more rule-like doctrines. Although lower federal
court judges do not appear to be influenced by ideology with respect to
many issues, we do see different voting patterns by Democratic and
Republican appointees with respect to these salient issues. 201 Accordingly,
the Justices are well-advised to guide, and thereby constrain, their judicial
inferiors in these contexts through broad, rule-like legal tests.
Such an approach would serve a valuable function. There is a
longstanding debate over whether judges are guided more by "law" or

Reflections Seventy-Five Years After theJudges' Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643,1712 (2000))).
An extended discussion of certification is beyond the scope of this Essay. But this Essay's
analysis of legitimacy tradeoffs in the federal judiciary could provide an additional
justification for allowing lower federal court judges to ask the Supreme Court to resolve
issues of federal law.

198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (mandating review by courts of appeals).
199. Sykes, supra note 193, at 2:46:24-2:46:35.
200. By contrast, through much of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court could
often effectively supervise its judicial inferiors through case-by-case error correction. See
Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 164, at 45-57. Indeed, in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, the Court's rulings were not widely available, and so the Justices
often could not guide the lower courts by establishing precedents. See id. at 4, 45-46, 59.
201. See Epstein et al., supra note 11, at 168, 213-14, 237 (reporting that "ideological
voting is less frequent" in the lower courts than in the Supreme Court); supra sections II.A.3,

II.B.3, and III.A.3 (discussing the empirical research showing ideological voting in highprofile areas). These differences may be exacerbated by geography. Lower federal judges
must live in the district or circuit to which they were appointed. See 28 U.S.C. § 134(b)
(stating that, with few exceptions, "[e]ach districtjudge ... shall reside in the district or one
of the districts for which he is appointed"); id. § 44(c) ("Except in the District of Columbia,
each circuit judge shall be a resident of the circuit for which appointed at the time of his
appointment and thereafter while in active service."). To the extent that ideology is partly
determined by geography ("red states" versus "blue states"), one might expect lower court
judges from different parts of the country to vote differently. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing

Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1590-91 (2008) (suggesting that lower federal judges may
reflect the ideology of their respective regions). Regional differences certainly impacted the
implementation of Brown I. See supra section II.A.1. Today, however, it may be that partisan
affiliation matters far more than geographic region. Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan

Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1078-82 (2014) (arguing that partisanship is the
dominant feature of federal-state disputes and stating that, "[i]nsofar as state identification
is driven by partisanship, individuals may . .. affiliate with states they do not inhabit").
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"politics."2 02 This Essay assumes that judges may be influenced by both
forces, particularly in salient cases. But as the preceding discussion
suggests, lower court judges-regardless of their background ideological
leanings-do follow the clear edicts of their judicial superiors. Accordingly, the Supreme Court could significantly reduce the relevance of
politics in lower court decisionmaking by articulating law in the form of
broad, rule-like doctrines. Such constraint could, in turn, help contribute
to the external legitimacy of the inferior federal bench.
B.

ProtectingSupreme Court Legitimacy

Nevertheless, in certain high-profile contexts, the Supreme Court has
issued opaque tests or denied certiorari entirely. To be sure, the Justices
may decline review or opt for narrow or open-ended doctrines for any
number of reasons, including the difficulty of reaching agreement on a
multimember Court. 203 But, as Brown II and Casey suggest, in high-profile
and contested areas, the Justices may be hesitant to articulate a broad new
doctrine out of concern for the Supreme Court's sociological legitimacy.
The Justices opted for the "all deliberate speed" formula in large part to
protect "the Court's prestige-its dignity interest in avoiding the issuance
of futile orders." 204 And in Casey, the Justices sought to protect the Court's
legitimacy by declining to overrule Roe v. Wade, while also "subject[ing]
law to democratic pressure by dismantling the trimester system of Roe. "205
A similar script has played out in the context of affirmative action.
Commentators argue that, in 2003, at least some Justices voted to allow
affirmative action on university campuses in order to preserve the Court's
reputation with political and business elites. 206 Then,just one decade later,
it looked as though a bare majority of the Court would invalidate an affirmative action plan from the University of Texas-and thereby transform the

202. For an overview of the debate, see Barry Friedman, The Politics ofJudicial Review,

84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 257-62, 264-70 (2005); see also Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter?
Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject Adjudication, 40J. Legal Stud. 333, 336-38, 35456 (2011) (discussing prior tests and offering a new one to analyze the relative impact of
law). Meanwhile, it is widely assumed that judges should not decide cases based on their
ideological preference for a specific result. See David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha, Anti-

Modalities, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 729, 746-50, 753-56 (2021).
203. It may, for example, be hard to put together a majority for a broad rule. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 825, 840 (2008). Moreover, some
Justices may have a jurisprudential preference for narrow decisions or more standard-like
solutions to legal problems. See Sullivan, justices, supra note 1, at 27, 95-96.
204. Klarman, supra note 48, at 313-14.
205. Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 142, at 429-30.
206. See Devins & Baum, supra note 28, at 47-48 (noting the influence of elites,
particularly businesses and the military, on the Court's affirmative action decisions);
Toobin, supra note 131, at 211-14, 218-20 (suggesting that amicus briefs from retired
military officers praising how affirmative action programs were used by West Point,
Annapolis, and Colorado Springs influenced Justice O'Connor's vote).
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Court's jurisprudence in that arena. 207 Justice Kennedy drafted a majority
opinion that would have done precisely that. 208 But, according to Joan
Biskupic, after Justice Sotomayor penned a blistering draft dissent, Justice
Kennedy pulled the draft opinion and assembled a different majority to
send the case back to the court of appeals for a second look. 209 A central
concern, Biskupic writes, was "how Sotomayor's personal defense of
affirmative action and indictment of the majority would ultimately play to

the public." 210
Legitimacy concerns also seem likely to weigh on the Justices as they
consider the next steps with respect to the Second Amendment. The
Justices remained silent on the issue for years, denying certiorari in every
gun rights case until 2019, when they opted to review a somewhat obscure
New York City regulation. 21 1 While the case was pending, the New York
state legislature passed a state law that preempted the city regulation, a fact
that led the Court ultimately to dismiss the claim as moot. 212
But for present purposes, an important-and extraordinary-aspect
of the case was a brief filed by several Democratic senators, which
suggested that a decision in favor of the gun rights claim could
compromise the Court's sociological legitimacy. 213 The senators
underscored that organizations like the National Rifle Association spent
considerable sums to push for the confirmation of recent Supreme Court
nominees Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh. 214 As a result, the senators
charged, any decision in favor of gun rights would make the Court appear
to be part of the pro-gun "political agenda. "215 The senators concluded
with a not-so-subtle warning (which harkened back to recent calls for court
207. See Joan Biskupic, Breaking In: The Rise of Sonia Sotomayor and the Politics of
200-01 (2014) [hereinafter Biskupic, Breaking In] (recounting that, during the

Justice

conference vote in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher1), 570 U.S. 297 (2013), "it
initially looked like a 5-3 lineup").
208. See id. at 206.
209. See Fisherl, 570 U.S. at 314-15; Biskupic, Breaking In, supra note 207, at 201-02,
205-10.
210. Biskupic, Breaking In, supra note 207, at 206.
211. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Will Review New York City Gun Law, N.Y. Times
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/us/politics/supreme-court-gunsnyc-license.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (suggesting that the law was the only
one preventing gun owners from carrying handguns to second homes or to out-of-city

shooting ranges).
212. The Court held that the plaintiffs' request for declaratory or injunctive relief was

moot. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526-27
(2020) (per curiam). The Court remanded the case to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to
seek leave to amend their complaint to add a damages claim. See id.
213. See Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Mazie Hirono, Richard Blumenthal,
Richard Durbin, and Kirsten Gillibrand as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9-18,

N.

Y

State Rifle &Pistol Assn, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (No. 18-280), 2019 WL 3814388.

214. See id. at 4-8 (discussing the advocacy for
Justice Barrett had not at that time joined the Court.

215. Id. at 3.

Justices

Gorsuch and Kavanaugh).
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packing): "The Supreme Court is not well. And the people know it.
Perhaps the Court can heal itself before the public demands it be
'restructured in order to reduce the influence of politics.'"216 Whether or
not the senators' brief influenced the Court's decision to dismiss the New
York gun rights case, 21 7 history suggests that at least some Justices will be
concerned about the external reaction to a future Second Amendment
decision-particularly as gun violence becomes a matter of increasingly
prominent public concern. 218

216. Id. at 17. Senator Whitehouse later claimed that the brief did not say anything
about court packing. Sheldon Whitehouse, The Supreme Court Has Become Just Another
Arm of the GOP, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
the-supreme-court-has-become-just-another-arm-of-the-gop/2019/09/06/8ad36642-Oe211e9-87fa-850la456c003_story.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). But many other
commentators, including all fifty-three Republican senators who signed a letter in
opposition to the amicus brief, interpreted the brief as a threat to pack the Court with
additional members. See Letter from Fifty-Three United States Senators to Scott S. Harris,

Clerk, Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://senmcconnell.app.box.com/s/
nnes38e3zb8019nnlqrrhl2lnb5lar9x [https://perma.cc/TFR9-YR69] ("The implication is
as plain as day: Dismiss this case, or we'll pack the Court."); see also Editorial Board,
Senators File an Enemy-of-the-Court Brief, Wall St.J. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/

articles/senators-file-an-enemy-of-the-court-brief-11565911608
Law Review)

(asserting that, "[b]y 'restructured,'

(on file with the Columbia

[Democrats] mean packed with new

Justices").
217. Interestingly, in a November 2020 speech, Justice Alito discussed this episode and
opined that the senators and other observers might view the Court's decision as capitulating
to the senators' "warning." He stated:
Five United States senators . . . wrote that the Supreme Court is a sick
institution and that if the Court did not mend its ways, well, it might have
to be, quote, "restructured." After receiving this warning, the Court did
exactly what the City and the senators wanted. It held that the case was
moot, and it said nothing about the Second Amendment .... I am not
suggesting that the Court's decision was influenced by the senators'
threat. But I am concerned that the outcome might be viewed that way by
the senators and others with thoughts of bullying the Court ....
Samuel Alito, Assoc. Just., Sup. Ct. of the U.S., Address at the Federalist Society Annual
Lawyers' Convention, at 40:40-45:43 (Nov. 12, 2020), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/
11/12/video-and-transcript-of-justice-alitos-keynote-address-to-the-federalist-society

[https://perma.cc/WN67-XQ5A] (video on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
218. See Nate Cohn & Margot Sanger-Katz, On Guns, Public Opinion and Public Policy

Often Diverge, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/
upshot/gun-control-polling-policies.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting
that public support for gun control has increased in the wake of recent shootings, but that
it is also polarized, with Republicans showing greater support for gun rights). Just before
this Essay went to press, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a new Second Amendment
case. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Case on Carrying Guns in Public, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/26/us/supreme-court-gun.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Notably, the Court narrowed the question on review.
Although the petition asked the Court to consider generally whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry a handgun outside the home for self-defense, the Court opted
to focus on the denial of the petitioners' licenses. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari

at i, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Corlett, No. 20-843 (U.S. filed Dec. 17, 2020), 2020 WL
7647665 (defining the original question presented as "[w] hether the Second Amendment
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The Justices' interest in the public reputation of the Court is understandable. (For now, this Essay brackets the question-discussed
below 2 T9-whether it is legally legitimate for the Justices to take such concerns into account in deciding cases.) After all, the Supreme Court cannot
function as an institution without some degree of sociological legitimacy. 220 Accordingly, the Justices may often be tempted to issue narrow
rulings or deny review in politically controversial cases. But commentators
have overlooked the fact that, in the course of protecting the legitimacy of
the Supreme Court, the Justices may put at risk the remainder of the
federal bench.
C.

Overlooked Effects on the Lower Courts

To underscore the stakes for the inferior federal judiciary, this section
begins with additional background on the lower court selection process,
which has become increasingly partisan and divisive in recent years. 221 This
process is important for a few reasons. First, the contentious nature of the
process illuminates the external reputation of the lower courts among
elites: If political actors and interest groups assumed that Democratic- and
Republican-appointed jurists would approach legal issues in the same way,
it would be hard to understand the fuss over judicial selection.
Accordingly, the process itself indicates that many elites view the inferior
federaljudiciary in ideological terms. Second, and crucially, some research
suggests that this divisive selection process could have a detrimental impact on the long-term public reputation of the inferior federal judiciary. 222
To be sure, Supreme Court doctrine is not solely responsible for the
contentiousness of the lower court selection process. There are several
interrelated factors, including the polarization of the political parties and
changes in Senate procedure. 223 But as the historical accounts of Brown H
and Casey underscore, Supreme Court doctrine is an important-and
often overlooked-part of the story. And this makes sense: When the
Court issues opaque doctrines in high-profile and contested areas (such as
abortion, affirmative action, or gun rights), that opens up space for lower
court judges to vote in more ideologically predictable ways. Presidents,

allows the government to prohibit ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying handguns
outside the home for self-defense"), with N.Y. State Rifle v. Corlett, No. 20-843, 2021 WL
1602643, at *1 (Apr. 26, 2021) (noting that the grant of certiorari was "limited to the
following question: Whether the State's denial of petitioner [s]' applications for concealedcarry licenses for self-defense violated the Second Amendment"). One commentator
suggests that the Court could issue "an extremely narrow, fact-bound decision." Aaron Tang
(@AaronTangLaw), Twitter (Apr. 26, 2021), https://twitter.com/AaronTangLaw/status/

1386754841679073283 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
219. See infra section IV.B.1.
220. See supra Part I.
221. See infra section IILC.1.

222. See infra section III.C.2.
223. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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senators, and interest groups begin to recognize that "all important legal
issues [in these salient areas] are being decided" by the inferior federal
judiciary." Political actors and interest groups thus have a strong
incentive to focus on the composition of the lower federal bench.
1. Elite Attitudes Toward the Lower Federal Courts. - Although many
commentators have recounted the contentious and partisan fights over
Supreme Court nominees,22 5 there has been far less attention paid to the
selection of inferior federal court judges. This Essay aims in part to introduce readers to that history: As discussed, for many years, lower court
appointments were patronage, not policymaking, opportunities. That began to change in the wake of Brown II, and even more so during the
Reagan presidency. 226 But attacks on lower court nominees became far
more common during the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations. 22 7 Starting in the late 1990s, Keith Whittington writes, "the odds of
a circuit court nomination being confirmed" seemed "little better than a
coin flip. "228
Throughout this period, Presidents, senators, and interest groups
increasingly sought to discern how a lower court nominee might vote in
politically salient cases. As Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain
lamented in 2003, "The politics that has come to dominate today's
nomination process is a politics that aims, before the fact, to ascertain how
a given nominee will decide a particular case-or, to be more precise, a
series of hot-button cases," such as those pertaining to abortion or
affirmative action. 229 Fifth Circuit Judge Carolyn King made a similar
observation in 2007, noting that both political actors and interest groups
scrutinized a nominee's position on "politically salient issues including
abortion [and] civil rights." 23 0
224. Scherer, supra note 29, at 19.
225. There is an important literature on the Supreme Court confirmation process. For
a small sample, see Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal
Appointments Process 11-13 (1994) (comparing the contemporary model of the
confirmation process with the intent of the Framers); Carl Hulse, Confirmation Bias: Inside
Washington's War over the Supreme Court, from Scalia's Death to Justice Kavanaugh 1718 (2019) (describing the political strategy behind the delay to confirm the late Justice
Scalia's seat); Laurence H. Tribe, God Save this Honorable Court: How the Choice of
Supreme CourtJustices Shapes Our History 77-79 (1985) (arguing that the Senate fulfills
its role in acting as a check on the President's power when rigorously scrutinizing Supreme
Court nominees); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 1202, 1202-03 (1988) (claiming that the Senate's role in the confirmation
process is largely political).

226. See supra sections II.A.3, II.B.3.
227. See Steigerwalt, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that "ideological tensions over the
staffing of the federal bench had grown to a fever pitch" by this time).
228. Whittington, Partisanship, supra note 31, at 525.
229. Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Today's Senate Confirmation Battles and the Role of the

Federal Judiciary, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 169, 172, 174 (2003).
230. Carolyn Dineen King, Lecture, Challenges to Judicial Independence and the Rule
of Law: A Perspective from the Circuit Courts, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 765, 773 (2007) (expressing
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231
The temperature rose further during the Obama Administration.
After Republicans repeatedly blocked or delayed nominations (including
those with support from a Republican home-state senator), the
Democratic-controlled Senate in 2013 exercised the "nuclear option"-a
procedural reform that dispensed with the filibuster for lower court
selection and allowed judges to be confirmed by simple majority vote. 232
This rule change allowed President Obama to fill a number of vacancies
(and far more quickly), while the President enjoyed a Senate controlled
by the same political party. 233 But confirmations slowed to a near standstill
in 2015, when Republicans took over the Senate. 234Judicial confirmations
did not pick up again until 2017, when President Trump came into office
with a Republican-controlled Senate. 235 Indeed, for the foreseeable future,
we may have seen the end of bipartisan support for lower federal court
nominees.

Meanwhile, there has been an apparent rise in political rhetoric
characterizing the inferior federal judiciary in partisan or ideological

concern about "an ever increasing and contentious focus" on whether appellate court
nominees "are committed ... to particular positions on . . . salient issues").
231. See Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman, New Wars of Advice and Consent: Judicial
Selection in the Obama Years, 97Judicature 48, 48 (2013) [hereinafter Binder & Maltzman,
New Wars] ("In many ways, advice and consent worsened over the Obama years .... "); see
also Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a

Usable Past, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 97-110 (2017) (describing the judicial selection battles).
232. See 159 Cong. Rec. 17,825-26 (2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting the
change); Binder & Maltzman, New Wars, supra note 231, at 48 (finding that during Obama's
first term, "Senate Republicans launch [ed] filibusters against nominees who had the
support of' home-state Republican lawmakers).
233. See Christina L. Boyd, Michael S. Lynch & Anthony J. Madonna, Nuclear Fallout:
Investigating the Effect of Senate Procedural Reform on Judicial Nominations, 13 Forum
623, 635-37 (2015) (observing that the rate of confirmation increased from around sixtytwo percent to eighty percent). President Obama likely could have placed even more judges
on the federal bench but for Democratic Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick
Leahy's decision to honor all (or virtually all) blue slips from Republican senators. See
Elliott Slotnick, Sara Schiavoni & Sheldon Goldman, Obama's Judicial Legacy: The Final

Chapter, 5 J.L. & Cts. 363, 369-70, 373 (2017).
234. See Whittington, Partisanship, supra note 31, at 532 ("When the Democrats lost
the chamber . . , judicial confirmations largely ground to a halt.").
235. See Kevin Freking, Trump Spotlights Confirmation of 150-Plus FederalJudges, AP

News (Nov. 6, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/7dc948029a54dab94e4c986cfa01a3
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Carrie Johnson, Trump's Judicial Appointments
Were Confirmed at Historic Pace in 2018, NPR (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/
2019/01/02/681208228/trumps-judicial-appointments-were-confirmed-at-historic-pace-in-

2018

[https://perma.cc/H5PJ-K69P]

(finding that

the

Trump Administration

has

"exceed[ed] the pace of the last five presidents"). In April 2019, the Senate further
streamlined the process by limiting debate on district court nominees. See Paul Kane,
Republicans Change Senate Rules to Speed Nominations as Leaders Trade Charges of
Hypocrisy, Wash. Post (April 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
republicans-change-senate-rules-to-speed-nominations-as-leaders-trade-charges-of-hypocrisy/

2019/04/03/86ec635a-5615-11e9-aa83-504f086bf5d6_story.html

(on file with the Columbia

Law Review) (noting the change from thirty hours of debate to two).
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terms. President Trump, for example, in 2018 dismissed a lower court
decision as the handiwork of an "Obama judge."236 When Chief Justice
Roberts responded by insisting that "[w] e do not have Obama judges or
Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges,"237 President Trump shot
back: "Sorry ChiefJustice John Roberts, but you do indeed have 'Obama
great if the 9th Circuit was indeed an
judges' . . .. It would be
238
'independent judiciary."'
Progressive elites, in turn, have sounded the alarm at what they
describe as the Republicans' effort to "nominat[e] extremely conservative
judges and confirm[] them at a breakneck speed."23 9 A May 2020 report
prepared by Democratic Senators Debbie Stabenow, Chuck Schumer, and
Sheldon Whitehouse declared that the judiciary is now "pack[ed] ... with
far-right extremists," most of whom "were chosen not for their
qualifications or experience-which are often lacking-but for their
240
demonstrated allegiance to Republican Party political goals."
2. Long-Term Effects on Public Reputation. - Elites, it seems, increasingly
view the lower federal courts in ideological terms. But the question
remains whether the contentiousness surrounding the inferior federal
judiciary may also impact its long-term legitimacy with the broader public.
Some federal judges have worried about such an impact. Over a decade
ago, Fifth Circuit Judge King asserted that "[j]udicial independence is

236. Adam Liptak, Trump Takes Aim at Appeals Court, Calling It a 'Disgrace', N.Y. Times
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/trump-appeals-courtninth-circuit.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
237. Sherman, supra note 20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ChiefJustice
Roberts).
238. Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump's Criticism of 'Obama Judge,' Chief Justice
Roberts
Defends Judiciary
as 'Independent',
Wash.
Post
(Nov. 21,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-

chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-1le896d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting President

Trump).
239. Trump Continues to Reshape Judiciary at Breakneck Speed, Am. Const. Soc'y: In
Brief (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/inbrief/trump-continues-to-reshape-judiciaryat-breakneck-speed [https://perma.cc/9UBY-7GGS]; see also Freking, supra note 235 (collect-

ing views of progressives).
&

240. Debbie Stabenow, Chuck Schumer & Sheldon Whitehouse, Democratic Pol'y
Commc'ns Comm., Captured Courts: The GOP's Big Money Assault on the Constitution,
Our
Independent
Judiciary,
and
the
Rule
of
Law
3
(2020),
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Courts%20Report%20-%2FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T73P-CFWY]; see also Freking, supra note 235 (noting that the judiciary
is now "packed with young judges whose views are far outside the mainstream" and that,
"[i]nstead of serving as neutral arbiters, these judges will push a conservative agenda that
will have lasting effects for generations"); Carl Hulse, Trump and Senate Republicans
Celebrate Making the Courts More Conservative, N.Y. Times (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/trump-senate-republicans-courts.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that Senator Schumer, D-NY, described Trump's
nominees as "the most unqualified and radical nominees in my time in this body" (internal
quotations marks omitted)).
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undermined ... by the high degree of political partisanship and ideology
that currently characterizes the process by which the President nominates
and the Senate confirms federal judges."" Such a "highly partisan or
ideological judicial selection process conveys the notion to the electorate
that judges are simply another breed of political agents, that judicial
decisions should be in accord with political ideology, all of which tends to
undermine public confidence in the legitimacy of the courts." 242
A 2006 survey by political scientists Sarah Binder and Forrest
Maltzman provides some empirical support for this intuition. 243 The
authors found that lower court judges "who come to the bench via a
contested nomination fare worse in the public's eye than do judges who
sailed through to confirmation." 24 4 Although "strong partisans" were
pleased when their own party's President selected a controversial nominee
(that is, someone who was strongly contested by the opposing party), other
members of the public tended to view the judge's decisions with more
suspicion. 24 5 Binder and Maltzman warn: "[P] artisan differences over
judicial nominees may be undermining the perceived legitimacy of the
federaljudiciary-a worrisome development for an unelected branch in a
system of representative government. "246
Bert Huang offers another sobering account. In 2019, Huang
examined public reactions to lower court decisions on the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. 24 Multiple lower courts had
held unlawful the Trump Administration's efforts to rescind Obama's
DACA program. 248 But Huang found that, even when the lower courts
ruled the same way, self-identified Republicans were more likely to trust
the legal analysis of a Bush appointee than a Clinton appointee. 24 9
3. Why Lower Court Sociological Legitimacy Matters. - The empirical
studies of lower court sociological legitimacy are limited; as discussed,
most scholars still focus on the Supreme Court. 25 0 But the existing research
supports the commonsense intuition that the contentiousness surrounding the inferior federal judiciary is not good for the long-term health of
241. King, supra note 230, at 773.
242. Id. at 782.
243. See Binder & Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 127-28.

244. Id. at 128.
245. Id. at 128, 138. The authors asked members of the public for their reaction to a
judge's decision about a gun regulation. See id. at 138-40.

246.
247.
248.
Regents

Id. at 11.
See Bert I. Huang, Judicial Credibility, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1053, 1055 (2020).
See id.; see also NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 215-16 (D.D.C. 2018);
of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1046

(N.D. Cal. 2018). The Supreme Court later agreed that the rescission was invalid. See Dep't

of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020) (holding that
the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act because
DHS did not "provide a reasoned explanation for its action").
249. See Huang, supra note 247, at 1060, 1076.
250. See supra Part I.
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those courts. After all, the inferior federal judiciary-no less than the
Supreme Court-can function effectively only if it enjoys external
legitimacy. The lower federal courts also have no army; they must rely on
other actors to enforce and obey their decrees. 251 Those external actors
are more likely to comply if they view the lower federal courts as
legitimate-that is, as institutions that do and should have the power to
make authoritative decisions.
Moreover, recall that "legitimacy is for [the] losers." 252 Lower court
judges need the support of those who disagreewith a decision, so that those
"losers" will obey the adverse ruling. Fifth Circuit Judge King was, at
bottom, concerned about compliance. She argued that the "highly
partisan or ideological judicial selection process . . . tends to undermine
public confidence in the legitimacy of the courts." 253 The resulting "loss of
public confidence in the legitimacy of the courts-confidence that courts
will decide impartially, in accordance with the rule of law-could, in turn,
undermine compliance by the public with unpopular decisions." 254
Notably, some commentators have suggested that President Trump's
attacks on lower federal courts were an attempt to undermine their public
reputation so that it would be easier for the Trump Administration to defy
a court order going forward. 255 My own work tracing the historical norms
of judicial independence suggests that such concerns are not without
foundation. As that work recounts, since at least the mid-twentieth century,
there has been a strong norm of compliance with federal court orders. 256
But this norm developed in part because of bipartisan political rhetoric
that treated noncompliance as off-the-wall. 257 Accordingly, this norm-like

251. See The Federalist No. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
("The judiciary ...
has no influence over either the sword or the purse .... It ... must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its

judgments.").
252. Gibson et al., supra note 36, at 839.

253. King, supra note 230, at 782.
254. Id.
255. See Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1244-45 (noting "the
concern that the President may be trying to establish a narrative that he can use after an
attack in order to rally a fearful public into accepting his disregard of judicial authority").
Other commentators have questioned whether the Trump Administration would adhere to
adverse federal court orders. See Aaron Blake, Constitutional Crisis? What Happens if
Trump Decides to Ignore a Judge's Ruling., Wash. Post: The Fix (Feb. 5, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/05/constitutional-crisiswhat-happens-if-trump-decides-to-ignore-a-judge (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
Nina Totenberg, Trump's Criticism ofJudges Out of Line with Past Presidents, NPR (Feb.

11, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/11/514587731/trumps-criticism-of-judges-outof-line-with-past-presidents [https://perma.cc/P6RG-PAUK]

(reporting these concerns).

256. See Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 488-505, 531-32.
257. See id. at 498-505, 531-32 (noting also the lack of contrary rhetoric).
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other norms ofjudicial independence-may be weakened if the rhetoric
surrounding the federal judiciary changes. 258
To be sure, it is difficult to assess the degree or immediacy of any risk
of defiance by the federal executive branch. The Trump Administration,
for its part, generally endeavored to comply with adverse federal court
decrees. 25 9 But the very fact that observers have raised these concerns
underscores an implicit recognition of the importance of sociological
legitimacy-not only for the Supreme Court but also for the inferior federal bench. Threats to the "perceived legitimacy of the [inferior] federal
judiciary" are "a worrisome development for an unelected branch in a
system of representative government. "260

258. See id. at 544 ("These conventions of judicial independence ...
could be
deconstructed ... if we alter the way in which we think and talk about the federal judicial

power."); cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Why Judicial Independence Fails, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1055,111518 (2021) (suggesting that the increasingly partisan nature of the judicial appointments
process at both the Supreme Court and lower federal court level might be problematic for
judicial independence).
259. See Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 501 (noting the Trump Administration's compliance with the injunctions blocking the President's travel bans as of early

2018); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Power of "So-CalledJudges," 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. Online
14, 17-20 (2018) (arguing that the federal executive has political and institutional
incentives to comply). Two recent cases warrant mention. First, according to media reports,
in early 2020, DHS removed an individual from the United States, despite a federal court
order granting a stay of removal. But DHS asserted that it did not knowingly violate a court
order because the individual was on the plane before DHS received a copy of the order. See
Deirdre Fernandes, Northeastern Student from Iran Removed from U.S. Is Just the Latest
Sent Away at Logan, Bos. Globe (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/01/
(on file with the
21/metro/iranian-student-removed-us-before-court-hearing-lawyer-says
Columbia Law Review). The second case involves litigation over the 2020 census. In fall 2020,
a federal district court found invalid the Trump Administration's decision to stop counting
on September 30, 2020-and indicated that counting should continue until the (previously
announced) October 31 deadline. See Nat'l Urb. League v. Ross, 489 F. Supp. 3d 939, 1003
(N.D. Cal. 2020). The Census Bureau then announced that the count would cease on
October 5. The district court accused the Administration of disobeying the earlier order,
directed the Administration to inform all census takers that the count would continue until
the end of October, and threatened executive officials with sanctions or contempt if they
failed to comply with the new order. See Hansi Lo Wang, After 'Egregious' Violation, Judge
Orders Census to Count Through Oct. 31 for Now, NPR (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/
2020/10/02/919224602/after-egregious-violation-judge-orders-census-to-count-throughoct-31-for-now [https://perma.cc/7B3L-RB3U]. At that point, the Census Bureau complied, indicating that the count would continue until October 31. See 2020 Census Will
Continue Until October 31 After Successful Legal Challenge, ABC News (Oct. 3, 2020),

https://abc3.com/census-2020-u.s.-bureau-vote/6725827

[https://perma.cc/9JU7-RNV7].

The Census Bureau changed its approach again only after the district court's order was

stayed by the Supreme Court. See Ross v. Nat'l Urb. League, 141 S. Ct. 18, 18 (2020);
Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Adam Liptak & Michael Wines, The Census, the Supreme Court
and Why the Count Is Stopping Early, N.Y. Times (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
article/census-supreme-court-ruling.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
260. Binder & Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 11.
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The Likelihood of a Tradeoff

This Essay argues that, when the Supreme Court is invited to change
the law in high-profile and contested areas, the Justices may face an
unappealing tradeoff. To preserve the external legitimacy of the Court,
the Justices may feel pressure not to issue the broad, rule-like doctrines
that can most effectively guide the lower courts. The Justices may thereby
not only sacrifice meaningful legal change but also pose risks for the longterm sociological legitimacy of the inferior federal bench.
How likely are the Justices to face such a tradeoff? In recent work, Neil
Siegel asserts that, at least in a subset of salient cases, the Supreme Court
may be able to work with the inferior federal courts to promote the
legitimacy of both. 261 Siegel points to recent litigation over same-sex
marriage: The Court in United States v. Windsorstruck down the Defense of
Marriage Act, which prohibited the federal government from recognizing
state-approved same-sex marriages. 262 Lower federal courts then, Siegel
argues, used Windsor "to legitimate their [subsequent] decisions" striking
down state bans on same-sex marriage. 263 And when the Supreme Court
itself required states to recognize same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges,
the Court sought to "blunt threats to its own legitimacy by invoking those
[earlier] district and circuit court decisions."2 " Siegel describes this
phenomenon as "reciprocal legitimation." 265
Siegel identifies an important phenomenon-one that seems to
capture the same-sex marriage saga. But "reciprocal legitimation" seems
unlikely to work with respect to many high-profile issues today. This
phenomenon envisions a federal judiciary that shares a common projectand thus seeks to push the law in a single direction. As Siegel describes, in
the wake of Windsor, both a majority ofJustices and most inferior federal
judges ruled in favor of marriage equality.266

261. See Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1186-87.

262. 570 U.S. 744, 757-58, 769-70, 775 (2013); see also Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation,
supra note 45, at 1186-87 (discussing Windsorand recent same-sex marriage litigation).
263. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1186.

264. Id. at 1186; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 662-63, app. A (2015)
(collecting cases).
265. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1186 ("The process is reciprocal
because lower federal courts and the Supreme Court each enlist the support of the other.").
For a different perspective on this litigation, see Emily Buss, The Divisive Supreme Court,
2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 25, 25-26 (arguing that the Supreme Court should have denied certiorari
in Obergefell and left the issue to the lower federal courts, who serve as "federal
representatives of the people of their states").
266. See Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation, supra note 45, at 1204, 1226-27 (stating that
the Court may use this approach if it anticipates that it can "persuade other federal courts
to decide an issue in the Court's preferred way"). Siegel argues that a similar phenomenon
occurred with respect to reapportionment and desegregation outside the school context.
See id. at 1186, 1203-05. Siegel focuses on Brown, arguing that, by ruling only on school
segregation, the Court invited lower courts to invalidate desegregation in other contexts,
such as restaurants, streetcars, and parks-and that lower courts largely accepted that
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But such a common project seems unlikely with respect to many of
the high-profile issues that are the focus of commentary today. As we have
seen, absent guidance from the Supreme Court, Democratic- and
Republican-appointed lower court judges often vote in distinct ways on
issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and gun rights. The lower
courts thus seem likely to push the law in opposing directions-and develop
a patchwork of disparate decisions (as happened in the wake of Brown II
and Casey)-ratherthan converge on a common project.
That is particularly true given that the lower federal judiciary has for
some time been an ideological patchwork. Over the past several decades,
the presidency has repeatedly changed hands between the Republican and
Democratic parties. And since Reagan, each President has sought to influence the ideological direction of the lower federal courts. When Reagan
entered office in 1981, more than sixty percent of the federaljudiciary had
been selected by Democratic Presidents.2 67 By the end of his presidency,
Reagan alone had appointed nearly half of the judiciary (forty-seven
percent), creating a majority of Republican appointees.2 68 Following the
Clinton presidency, the inferior federal courts were roughly evenly split
between Democratic- and Republican-appointed jurists. 269 And although
George W. Bush increased the number of Republican appointees, 270
President Obama largely evened the balance during his first term in
office. 271 Obama made even greater strides after Democrats eliminated the
filibuster (and before Republicans retook the Senate), such that he "was
finally able to shift the overall partisan balance on the lower federal courts
in the Democrats' favor." 272 Over four years, with a Republican-controlled

invitation. See id. at 1203-05. This Essay does not seek to contest Siegel's historical account

as to desegregation outside the school context. For present purposes, the important point
is that reciprocal legitimation is most likely to work when the Supreme Court and the
inferior federal judiciary are engaged in a common project. In our currently divided
polity-with increasingly divided courts-that seems unlikely in various salient areas.
267. See Goldman, Picking Federal

Judges,

supra note 89, at 260.

268. See Goldman, Reagan, supra note 182, at 318-19.
269. See Binder & Maltzman, Advice, supra note 31, at 102 (noting that, even by 2002,
"the active judiciary was composed of 380 judges appointed by Republican presidents and
389 judges appointed by Democratic presidents").
270. See Slotnick et al., supra note 233, at 410 (stating that, at the beginning of Obama's
presidency, "the cohort ofjudges appointed by Democrats" was 39.1%).
271. Binder & Maltzman, New Wars, supra note 231, at 56 ("After four years of Obama
appointments... , the bench is coming closer to parity .... ").
272. Slotnick et al., supra note 233, at 410, 414-15 (finding that "the cohort of judges
appointed by Democrats increased from 39.1% to 51.6%" and that eight of the twelve
regional courts of appeals had Democratic majorities); see also Anne Joseph O'Connell,
Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of

Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 Duke L.J. 1645, 1649-50 (2015); U.S.
Courts, Judgeship Appointments by President, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/

files/apptsbypres.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ4Z-J3H7]

(reporting that Obama appointed

268 district judges and forty-nine regional appellate court judges, for a total of 317). One
recent study argues that the elimination of the filibuster itself is likely to lead to a more

2021]

SACRIFICING LEGITIMACY

1601

Senate (and no filibuster), President Trump again transformed the lower
federal courts. Trump alone appointed around 200 judges, including over
one-quarter of the federal courts of appeals.2 73 Yet many Democraticappointed jurists remain on the federal bench.274
Accordingly, for the past several decades, the lower federal judiciary
has been populated by a mix of Republican and Democratic appointees.
This mix likely does not matter in many areas of law. But as we have seen,
in certain high-profile contexts, when Supreme Court doctrine is opaque,
there is a noticeable difference in the voting patterns of Democratic- and
Republican-appointed jurists. That is why the Justices have good reason to
articulate broad, rule-like doctrines to guide their judicial inferiors. By
contrast, when the Court fails to provide such guidance, lower courtjudges
are unlikely to converge on a common approach. Instead, we can expect
to see what we in fact do see: noticeable differences in lower court
decisions in salient cases-in ways that raise the stakes for judicial
appointments and pose risks for the long-term legitimacy of the inferior
federal bench.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

This Essay aims in large part to draw attention to two (related)
phenomena that have been overlooked in the literature: the potential
tradeoffs between legal change and legitimacy, and between Supreme
Court and lower court legitimacy. To preserve the sociological legitimacy
of the Court, the Justices may sacrifice both meaningful legal change and
the long-term reputation of the remainder of the federal bench. This Part
argues that these tradeoffs complicate several practical and theoretical
debates about the role of the federal judiciary in the constitutional
scheme.

A.

What It Takesfor a ConstitutionalRevolution

Those who follow the Supreme Court from time to time predict a
constitutional revolution. Today, commentators forecast an overhaul of
the Court'sjurisprudence on topics including abortion, affirmative action,

polarized judiciary. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Joanna Shepherd, Filibuster Change and

Judicial Appointments, 17J. Empirical Legal Stud. 646, 649 (2020).
273. See Devan Cole & Ted Barrett, Senate Confirms Trump's 200th Judicial Nominee,

CNN (June

24, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/24/politics/trump-200-judicial-

appointments-cory-wilson/index.html
[https://perma.cc/X4RT-NQKP]; see also Joan
Biskupic, Trump Transformed the Supreme Court that Mostly Helped Advance His Agenda,
CNN (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/19/politics/trump-supreme-courtlegacy/index.html [https://perma.cc/EU4J-DF9W] ("After four years, the President has

filled 177 of the 682 district court judgeships (26%) and 54 of the 179 appeals court
judgeships (30%) .... ").
274. See supra notes 271-272 and accompanying text.
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gun rights, and the administrative state.27 5 But this Essay suggests that any
such revolution faces significant obstacles.
In order to ensure a revolution in the high-profile areas that are of
interest to commentators, the Justices should issue broad, rule-like
doctrines. Such precedents would most effectively guide-and constrainthe lower courts. But out of concern for the legitimacy of the Supreme
Court as a whole, the Justices may feel pressure not to issue broad, rule-like
precedents in precisely those high-profile areas. Instead, the Justices may
opt for more open-ended standards or deny certiorari entirely. In our
federal judiciary-where the lower courts have for decades been
populated by a mix of Democratic and Republican appointees (with
fundamentally different perspectives on issues such as abortion,
affirmative action, and gun rights)-opaque tests are unlikely to lead to
any revolution. Instead, we are likely to see a patchwork of highly variant
lower court rulings-as occurred in the wake of Brown IIand Casey.
We may soon see a similar pattern with respect to the administrative
state. Conservative and libertarian elites have, in recent years, led a
sustained attack on government regulation (a trend that Gillian Metzger
dubbed "anti-administrativism"),276 and many observers in June 2019 expected the Supreme Court to begin a revolution in administrative law-by
reversing prior decisions that require deference to agency interpretations
of regulations: Auer deference. 277 Instead, Justice Kagan's majority opinion
in Kisor v. Wilkie purported to reaffirm Auer, while crafting a complex new
five-part test, such that "Auer deference is sometimes appropriate and
sometimes not." 278
Kisor not only failed to provide the legal
conservatives and libertarians but also seems likely
pressure on the inferior federal judiciary. As some
observed, the scope of "Kisor deference" will depend

change sought by
to put considerable
commentators have
heavily on the lower

275. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (collecting sources). Recent events are
likely to deepen these concerns. Just before this Essay went to press, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in a gun rights case (although it narrowed the question on review). See
supra note 218. The Court also opted to hear a case involving a state law that, with few
exceptions, prohibits abortion after fifteen weeks. See Brent Kendall &Jess Bravin, Supreme

Court to Review Mississippi Law Limiting Abortion Rights, Wall St.

J.

(May 17, 2021),

https://www.wsj .com/articles/supreme-court-to-consider-abortion-restrictions-from-

mississippi-11621259099 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
276. Metzger, Administrative State, supra note 5, at 3-7, 64-69 (critiquing the "attack
on the national administrative state" led by "business interests and conservative forces");
see also Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auerand Chevron Deference: A Literature Review,

16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 103, 104 (2018) (detailing "a growing call from the federal bench,
on the Hill, and within the legal academy to rethink" administrative deference doctrines).

&

277. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Tom Lorenzen, Dan Wolff

Sharmistha Das, The Final Auer Midnight Approaches for an Important Deference
Doctrine, ABA (March 8, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment
energyresources/publications/trends/2018-2019/march-april-2019/the-final-auer
(on
file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The demise of Auer seems imminent.").

278. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408, 2414-18 (2019).
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federal courts. 279 And Kisor comes on the legal scene at a time when
Presidents, senators, and interest groups are already more closely focused
on judicial attitudes toward the administrative state. 28 0 According to thenTrump White House Counsel Don McGahn, a new "litmus test" for
Republican judicial appointees at all levels is skepticism toward federal
regulation. 281 Thus, like Casey, Kisormayincrease the pressure on the lower
court selection process, with Republicans and Democrats seeking to put
individuals with the "correct views" on the inferior federal bench.
The Justices have repeatedly proven resistant to issuing the broad,
rule-like doctrines needed to guide the inferior federal courts in certain
high-profile contexts. This analysis not only underscores the difficulty of a
Supreme Court-led revolution as a descriptive matter but also has
significant normative implications for scholarly debates over judicial
legitimacy-to which this Essay now turns.
B.

The NarrowFocus on Supreme CourtLegitimacy

Prominent scholars have argued that the Supreme Court should
decide cases so as to preserve its sociological legitimacy. 28 2 Notably, the
force of this argument depends in part on a given Justice's approach to
constitutional interpretation; some interpretive methods likely foreclose
such considerations. But, significantly for purposes of this Essay, the
argument also reflects scholars' singular emphasis on the Supreme Court.
As the next section explores, the normative question-should the Justices
aim to protect the Court's reputation?-becomes far more challenging
once we consider the entire federal judiciary.
1. A Contingency: Interpretive Method. - At the outset, this Essay
addresses a preliminary question: whether it is legally legitimate for a
279. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1, 8, 66 (noting that the Court "punt[ed] the difficult questions back to the lower
courts," and thus, "it will be how the lower courts apply Kisor... that will establish Kisor's
impact on administrative law in practice"); Christopher J. Walker, What KisorMeans for the
Future of Auer Deference: The New Five-Step Kisor Deference Doctrine, Yale J. on Regul.:
Notice & Comment (June 26, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-kisor-means-forthe-future-of-auer-deference-the-new-five-step-kisor-deference-doctrine
[https://perma.cc/
WY9W-77RH] (comparing the Kisor test to the "less-deferential Skidmore doctrine, under
which administrative interpretations of law receive deference based on their 'power to

persuade"').
280. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
281. Jeremy W. Peters, Trump's NewJudicial Litmus Test: Shrinking 'the Administrative

State', N.Y. Times (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/us/politics/
trump-judges-courts-administrative-state.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see
also Craig Green, Deconstructing the Administrative State: Constitutional Debates over
Chevron and Political Transformation in American Law 109-10 (Temple Univ. Legal Stud.

Rsch. Paper No. 2018-35, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3264482

(on file with the

Columbia Law Review) (discussing the Trump Administration's efforts to "deconstruct" the
administrative state by "decreasing administrative flexibility, endorsing judicially imposed
constitutional limits, and appointing Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court").

282. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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Justice to take external legitimacy into account in deciding cases. The
answer depends in significant part on ajustice's approach to constitutional
interpretation. Notably, throughout this discussion, the Essay presumes
that there is no one "correct" interpretive method, and thus each
individual judge has substantial discretion to select her preferred
interpretive approach. 28 The goal here is to explore whether some
methods could be open to the consideration of external legitimacy.
In past work, I have suggested that, under a variety of interpretive
methods, it is not legally legitimate for a Justice to switch a vote-by, for
example, voting to uphold rather than strike down a law-in order to
protect the Supreme Court's public reputation. 28 4 But my past work did
not address whether ajustice may consider sociological legitimacy at allfor example, in fashioning an operative doctrine such as "all deliberate
speed" or "undue burden." This Essay takes up that question.
Under some methods of interpretation, any reliance on sociological
legitimacy is likely legally illegitimate. For example, under prominent
versions of originalism, judges have an obligation to enforce the original
meaning of constitutional provisions. 2 5 Such an approach should exclude
consideration of the Court's modern-day reputation. 28 6
283. Cf. Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 43, at 131 (making a similar
assumption); Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench:
A Survey of Forty-TwoJudges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1298, 1345
(2018) (finding that a majority of lower court judges surveyed believe either that the
Supreme Court cannot dictate a method of statutory interpretation or that it does not do so
in a fashion that is consistent enough to be precedential).
284. See Grove, Legitimacy Dilemma, supra note 8, at 2245-46, 2254-72 (arguing that
such switches are likely not legally legitimate and must thus be justified, if at all, on
alternative normative grounds). Some commentators allege that Chief Justice Roberts
switched his vote in NFIB v. Sebelius, which upheld the Affordable Care Act's individual
mandate under the federal taxing power. See 567 U.S. 519, 575 (2012); Grove, Legitimacy
Dilemma, supra note 8, at 2243, 2254-55; see also Joan Biskupic, The Chief: The Life and

Turbulent Times of Chief Justice John Roberts 221-22, 233-48 (2019) (detailing the Chief
in a chapter entitled "A Switch in Time").

Justice's change

285. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in
Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 1 (2015) (underscoring that "two core ideas
of originalist constitutional theory" are that "[t]he meaning of the constitutional text is
fixed when each provision is framed and ratified" and that "the original meaning of the
constitutional text should constrain constitutional practice"). But see Stephen E. Sachs,
Originalism Without Text, 127 Yale L.J. 156, 157 (2017) (arguing that the "conventional"
view is "mistaken" and that "[o] riginalism is not about the text").
286. Some versions of new originalism may allow the consideration of "sociological
legitimacy" as part of the construction zone. See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
Originalist approaches that take a more positivist turn-and argue for originalism on the
ground that it is "our law"-are a more complex case. One would presumably need evidence
that the Court looked to sociological legitimacy in its early days-and perhaps that it did so
candidly and openly. For the positivist theory, see William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?,

115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349, 2351-53, 2363-86 (2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a
Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 817, 844-74 (2015). One might need
similar evidence for original methods originalism, a theory that advocates using only those
interpretive rules in place around the time that the Constitution was adopted. For an
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The opinions of two prominent originalists help to illustrate this
point. In Casey, Justice Scalia was "appalled by[] the Court's suggestion"
that a judicial decision "must be strongly influenced" by "public
opposition .... Instead of engaging in the hopeless task of predicting
public perception-a job not for lawyers but for political campaign
managers-the Justices should do what is legally right .
"287 Along the
same lines, Justice Thomas chastised the Court for denying certiorari in a
case involving Medicaid benefits because "some respondents ...
are
named 'Planned Parenthood."' 288 Justice Thomas insisted that even a
"tenuous connection to [the] politically fraught issue [of abortion] does
not justify abdicating our judicial duty. If anything, neutrally applying the
law is all the more important when political issues are in the

background."289
Ronald Dworkin's theory of law as integrity also largely forecloses
reliance on sociological legitimacy. Under this approach,judges must find
the "right answer" to legal questions by relying on text, history, and "moral
principles about political decency and justice."29 0 According to Dworkin,
the Justices should not decline to recognize constitutional rights in order
to protect the "standing and legitimacy" of the Supreme Court. 29 1
Although this theory does leave room for consideration of sociological legitimacy in extraordinary cases-"if the authority of the Supreme Court
or of the constitutional arrangement as a whole were actually at stake"-

account of original methods originalism, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against

Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751, 751-53, 758-72 (2009).
287. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 997-99 (1992) (Scalia,

J.,

dissenting); see also id. at 998 ("[W]hether it would 'subvert the Court's legitimacy' or not,
the notion that we would decide a case differently from the way we otherwise would have in
order to show that we can stand firm against public disapproval is frightening.").

288. Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 408, 408-09 (2018)
(Thomas,J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Court should resolve
the question presented-involving private rights of action under Medicaid-and stating:
"So what explains the Court's refusal to do itsjob here? I suspect it has something to do with
the fact that some respondents in these cases are named 'Planned Parenthood"'). Justices
Alito and Gorsuch joined the opinion. Id. at 408.

289. Id. at 410.
290. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 23, 10-11 (1996) (advocating a "moral reading" of the abstract clauses of the Constitution);
see also Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes 41-43, 133-34 (2006) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Justice in Robes] (reiterating the moral reading and advocating the one-right-answer
thesis); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 266-71 (1986) (advocating the one-right-answer
thesis and discussing criticisms).
291. Dworkin, Justice in Robes, supra note 290, at 256-58 (arguing against such a
"passive or cautionary strategy"). Admittedly, Dworkin does not focus on implementing doctrines (such as "all deliberate speed" or "undue burden"), so it is possible that his theory
would work differently in that context. But his analysis seems, at a minimum, to cast doubt
on the legal legitimacy of any consideration of sociological legitimacy.
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Dworkin is skeptical that such a situation is likely to arise. 29 2 Accordingly,
this theory does not seem to countenance reliance on external legitimacy.
Many other interpretive approaches, however, seem open to at least
some consideration of sociological legitimacy. That is, under these methods, it may be legally legitimate for a justice to articulate legal doctrine so
as to safeguard the Supreme Court's external reputation. For example, a
Justice who favors pragmatism, 293 common law constitutionalism, 294 and
some forms of new originalism, 295 may take into account functional concerns. 296 And there is a strong functional reason for the Justices to consider
sociological legitimacy in formulating doctrine: "[B] ecause the Court's
power depends on its image, in order to maintain its effectiveness, the
Court must take care to preserve the esteem in which it is held." 297

292. Id. at 259 ("I'm tempted to think ...

[the Court] can survive almost anything.").

293. See Richard A. Posner, HowJudges Think 230-50 (2008) (advocating pragmatism).
294. See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 43-49 (2010) (articulating and
defending common law constitutionalism).
295. Some versions of new originalism would seem to allow the consideration of
"sociological legitimacy" as part of the construction zone. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Living
Originalism 179-82 (2011) (relying, in part, on functional concerns in examining the
implementation of the Commerce Clause over time).
296. Philip Bobbitt's ConstitutionalFate does not focus on operative doctrines such as
"all deliberate speed." But Bobbitt endorses Alexander Bickel's passive virtues more
generally, suggesting that the Court's legitimacy is an acceptable "prudential" concern in
constitutional decisionmaking. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the

Constitution 66-69, 213 (1982) (favorably discussing Bickel's view that, "by prudently
avoiding some controversies and by handling others in subtle, indirect ways the Court could
preserve its independence and authority for those few cases that should be decided on the
merits"); id. at 7 (identifying various acceptable modalities of constitutional argument,
including historical, textual, structural, prudential, doctrinal, and ethical arguments); see
also infra section IV.B.2 (discussing Bickel's passive virtues).
297. Hellman, supra note 25, at 1151; see also Wells, supra note 25, at 1015 (" [T]he
Court, in order to achieve its goals, has to be concerned with what other people think of
it."). There is, however, one complication. Many scholars assert that the Justices cannot
openly admit that they considered sociological legitimacy. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 25, at
1051 (arguing that the Justices should sometimes subordinate legal legitimacy-defined as
candor in legal reasoning-to the imperative of achieving "sociological legitimacy"); see
also Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory ofJudicial Candor, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1307, 1356,
1388-94 (1995) (urging that "full candor may harm perceived judicial legitimacy" in some
contexts). But see Hellman, supra note 25, at 1149-50 (advocating "[t]he candidrecognition
of the importance of the continued vitality of the Court"). That is, the Justices may have to
sacrifice what many view as a central element of legal legitimacy:judicial candor. See Fallon,
Law and Legitimacy, supra note 43, at 129-32, 142-48; Micah Schwartzman, Judicial

Sincerity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 987, 990-91 (2008) (defending an approach in which "judges have
a general duty to comply with a principle of sincerity in their decisionmaking"); David L.

Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731, 736-38 (1987) (advocating
"a strong presumption in favor of candor"); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme

Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Md. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1979) (suggesting that opinions should
include all the grounds on which judges relied); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Theory of

Judicial Candor, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 2265, 2282-83 (2017) (articulating a minimal and ideal
norm of candor in judicial decisionmaking). There may thus be another tradeoff: in this
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2. Saving the Court: Minimalism and the Passive Virtues. - Many interpretive methods thus seem to allow the Justices to articulate doctrine with
an eye toward preserving the Supreme Court's external reputation. Yet
how should the Justices go about that task? Scholars do not always explain
this point with great clarity, but Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein have
concrete suggestions: The Justices should issue narrow or open-ended
("minimalist") rulings, or perhaps avoid deciding cases entirely, in order
to deflect "public outrage."2 98 This work vividly illustrates the tendency of
scholars to focus on the external legitimacy of the Supreme Court alone.
In The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel famously articulates the
"countermajoritarian difficulty," the idea that the Supreme Court's power
ofjudicial review is "a deviant institution in the American democracy. "299
But importantly, Bickel's goal is not to undermine Supreme Court review.
On the contrary, he seeks to defend the Court's constitutional role-and
to articulate how it can be exercised cautiously and prudently. 3 00 Bickel
aims to show how the Justices can decide cases so as to safeguard
constitutional rights, while also protecting the Supreme Court's long-term
sociological legitimacy.
Part of Bickel's answer lies in what he dubs the "passive virtues": The
Court should use jurisdictional devices (such as standing, the political
question doctrine, and certiorari dismissals) to "stay[] its hand" in some
controversial cases so that the Court can play its full role in other cases. 301
But Bickel does not focus exclusively on jurisdiction. Bickel also applauds
the "all deliberate speed" formula as a way to reconcile principle with expediency. 302 Given the possibility of noncompliance by segregationists,
Bickel argues, the Supreme Court was correct to reject the "shock
treatment" proposed by the NAACP and instead to allow a more gradual
approach. 303 Through "all deliberate speed"-a phrase that, according to
case, between legal and sociological legitimacy. A full examination of this issue is beyond
the scope of this Essay. But I hope to explore it in future work.

298. Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges
Care?, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 155, 158-59 (2007) [hereinafter Sunstein, Outraged].
299. See Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 16-18.
300. See id. at 132; see also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The

History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153, 159 (2002)
(emphasizing that "The Least DangerousBranchwas a defense of judicial review").
301. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 69-72, 112-33. See generally
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961) (discussing the Supreme Court's use of doctrines like standing and
political question to decline the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise granted to it). For a
prominent critique, see generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev.
1 (1964) (advancing various difficulties with Bickel's thesis). For discussion of additional
critiques of Bickel, see Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control,

and Related Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 714-18 (2012).
302. See Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 253-54.
303. Id. at 250, 252-53 (arguing that caution was the wiser approach, particularly given
that "resistance could be expected").
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Bickel, "resembles poetry"-"[t]he Court placed itself in position to engage in a continual colloquy with the political institutions" and enable
them to gradually accept the principle of desegregation.3 04
Bickel expressly states in The Least DangerousBranch that he does not
seek to address the lower federal bench.3 05 According to Bickel, "[I] n no
event is constitutional adjudication in the lower federal courts the
equivalent of what can be had in the Supreme Court." 306 "[T] he lower
courts can act in constitutional matters as stop-gap or relatively ministerial

decisionmakers only. "307
Even in 1962, when Bickel first published The Least DangerousBranch,
that was an extraordinary statement. As this Essay has underscored, the
success (or failure) of desegregation depended tremendously on the "fiftyeight lonely men" who, at the time, comprised the inferior federal
judiciary across the South. 30 As Judge Wisdom explained in 1967,
"[T] here [were] so few Supreme Court decisions on school desegregation
that inferior courts must improvise . . . . To this extent, the [courts of
appeals were] forced into a policy-making position as to decisions only
tangentially dependent on the Supreme Court." 309
Bickel is not alone in his singular emphasis on the Supreme Court.
Most of the literature on the Court's sociological legitimacy has likewise
overlooked the remainder of the federal judiciary. 310 For example,
building on his work on judicial minimalism 311 Sunstein argues that the
Justices should at times issue narrow rulings in order to deflect "public
outrage. "312 Such a minimalist approach is particularly urgent today,
Sunstein insists, as Supreme Court watchers anticipate a constitutional
revolution: Following the appointment of Justices by President Trump,
"the nation could be in for a wild ride" with respect to issues including
abortion and affirmative action, such that "the meaning of the
Constitution looks a lot like the political convictions of the Republican

304. Id. at 253-54.
305. Id. at 198 ("I have not addressed myself, in this chapter or elsewhere, to the role
of the lower federal courts .... ").

306. Id. at 126.
307. Id. at 198.
308. Peltason, supra note 54, at 28-29; see also supra section II.A.2 (describing the
discretion that federal district judges wielded over the pace of desegregation in their

respective districts).
309. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 426-27.
310. See supra notes 42-45.
311. See, e.g., Sunstein, One Case, supra note 26, at 3-23 (advocating minimalism).
312. See Sunstein, Outraged, supra note 298, at 158-59, 169-75, 211 (aiming to justify
this approach largely on consequentialist grounds); see also Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should

They? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, ShouldJudges Care?, 60
Stan. L. Rev. 213, 215 (2007) (suggesting that "judges should care about public outrage
out of respect for democracy" (emphasis omitted)).
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Party."313 Sunstein argues: "That would be ugly and dangerous .... As
much as any time in American history, this is a period for judicial
minimalism" at the Supreme Court. 314
C.

Expanding the Focus to the EntireJudiciary

When one focuses exclusively on the Supreme Court, it is easy to see
the appeal of narrow rulings or certiorari denials in high-profile areas.
Broad, rule-like doctrines seem likely to trigger attacks on the Court.
Indeed, today, we see signs of precisely that. As commentators forecast a
complete overhaul of Supreme Court doctrine-on issues such as
abortion, affirmative action, and gun rights-there has been an uptick in
anti-Court rhetoric. 315 Some critics advocate strong measures: It may be
time to end life tenure (by statute) ,316 strip federaljurisdiction,317 impeach
313. Cass R. Sunstein, Kavanaugh Confirmation Won't Affect Supreme Court's
Legitimacy, Bloomberg (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2018-09-30/kavanaugh-confirmation-won-t-affect-supreme-court-s-legitimacy
(on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Sunstein, Kavanaugh Confirmation] (arguing that,
given the "cloud" cast by the Kavanaugh hearings on the Court's legitimacy, "[a]s much as
any time in American history, this is a period forjudicial minimalism"). Sunstein made these
comments following the appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. But this
argument could be seen as even more pressing in the wake ofJustice Ginsburg's death, and
Justice Barrett's subsequent appointment to the Court. See supra notes 8-9 (noting that
these events seem to have led to an increase in the attacks on the Court's legitimacy).
314. Sunstein, Kavanaugh Confirmation, supra note 313.
315. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. This rhetoric has only increased since
the tragic passing of Justice Ginsburg. See Matt Ford, The Consequences of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's Death for American Democracy, New Republic
(Sept. 18, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/159425/consequences-ruth-bader-ginsburgs-deathamerican-democracy [https://perma.cc/6G6Q-PBR2] (arguing that Justice Ginsburg's
"death amplifies a growing legitimacy crisis for the Supreme Court"); see also David YaffeBellany, Liberals Weigh Jurisdiction Stripping to Rein in Supreme Court, Bloomberg (Oct.
6, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-06/to-rein-in-supreme-courtsome-democrats-consider-jurisdiction-stripping (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting that "progressive lawmakers and left-wing activists are calling for" term limits, court
packing, and jurisdiction stripping, as they "[f]ac[e] the prospect of a 6-3 conservative
majority on the high court following the death ofJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg").
316. See Ian Ayres &John Fabian Witt, Opinion, Democrats Need a Plan B for the Supreme
Court. Here's One Option., Wash. Post (July 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/democrats-need-a-plan-b-for-the-supreme-court-heres-one-option/2018/07/27/

4c77fd4e-91a6-11e8-b769-e3fffl7f0689_story.html

(on file with the Columbia Law Review)

(advocating a statute setting "18-year terms ... followed by life tenure" on a lower federal
court); Kermit Roosevelt & Ruth-Helen Vassilas, Opinion, Supreme Court Justices Should

Have Term Limits, CNN (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/30/opinions/
[https://perma.cc/URH7-BVG4].
supreme-court-term-limits-law-roosevelt-vassilas/index.html
Several Democratic lawmakers are reportedly working on such a bill. See Juliegrace Brufke,
House Democrat to Introduce Bill Imposing Term Limits on Supreme Court Justices, Hill
(Sept. 25, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/518195-house-democrat-to-introducebill-imposing-term-limits-on-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/SC4V-MG88].
317. See Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 Cal.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6-7, 22-25), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665032
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that strippingjurisdiction from the Supreme
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Justices, 318 disobey Supreme Court decisions, 319 or "pack" the Court with
additional members. 320
In this environment, the Justices may be reasonably concerned about
the sociological legitimacy of the Supreme Court-and drawn to the
approach suggested by Bickel and Sunstein. In an era of political
turbulence, it may seem that the most effective way to preserve the Court's
public reputation is either to deny review altogether in high-profile cases
or to issue narrow doctrines that do not clearly push the law in any specific
direction. "As much as any time in American history," this may seem like
"a period for judicial minimalism" at the Supreme Court. 321
1. The Impact of a MinimalistApproach. - Once we consider the entire
federal judiciary, however, the picture becomes significantly more
nuanced and complex. Importantly, narrow or opaque (or nonexistent)
Supreme Court rulings do not simply return a legal issue to the political
branches-as Bickel and Sunstein have at times suggested. 322 The issue
goes to the lower courts. And, in contrast to the Supreme Court, the lower
federal courts cannot simply decline review; they have mandatory
jurisdiction. 323 Accordingly, the lower courts must decide high-profile
cases, with or without guidance from their judicial superiors. For example,

Court "would favor progressive outcomes immediately" even though the long-term partisan
impact would be unpredictable); Christopher Jon Sprigman, Congress's Article III Power

and the Process of Constitutional Change, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1778, 1780-82 (2020)
(suggesting that broad congressional authority to strip jurisdiction from the Supreme Court
could "help reconcile constitutionalism with democracy" and thereby "help preserve the
legitimacy of courts as enforcers of constitutional rules").
318. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Opinion, The Case for Impeaching Kavanaugh,

N.Y. Times (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/kavanaughimpeachment.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
319. See Mark Joseph Stern, How Liberals Could Declare War on Brett Kavanaugh's
Supreme Court, Slate (Oct. 4, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/brettkavanaugh-confirmation-constitutional-crisis.html [https://perma.ccV/WV22-AA9C] (arguing
that "[b]lue states may be pressured to disregard [the] decisions" of a conservativedominated court).
320. See supra notes 9, 213-216, and accompanying text. Just before this Essay went to
press, a group of House and Senate Democrats introduced legislation to expand the size of
the Supreme Court from nine to thirteen members. See Carl Hulse, Democrats' Supreme
Court Expansion Plan Draws Resistance, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/04/15/us/politics/democrats-supreme-court-expansion.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
321. Sunstein, Kavanaugh Confirmation, supra note 313.
322. See Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 254 (arguing that, with the
"all deliberate speed" formula, "[t]he Court placed itself in position to engage in a
continual colloquy with the political institutions"); Sunstein, One Case, supra note 26, at
118 (claiming, with respect to affirmative action, that the Court's "complex, rule-free, highly
particularistic opinions have had the salutary consequence of helping to stimulate"
democratic debate).

323. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction),

appeals).

(2018) (granting the Supreme Court broad

with id. § 1291

(mandating review by courts of
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as Seventh Circuit Judge Sykes observed, the Supreme Court has not
"give [n] us any doctrine about ...
how to reconcile conflicts between
Second Amendment gun rights and the public's right to regulation of
dangerous instrumentalities."3 24 Nevertheless, the inferior federal courts
cannot "duck the hard Second Amendment case .... We need to decide
it."325

When the Supreme Court issues a minimalist decision on a high-profile issue (and fails to later clarify the law), the lower federal courts must
take the lead on the content of federal law. And, without the constraining
force of broad, rule-like precedents, inferior judges in high-profile and
contested cases tend to be more influenced by their background ideological leanings. That is precisely what worried Thurgood Marshall during the
Brown Ilargument: Without a firm deadline for desegregation, "the Negro
in this country would be in a horrible shape" because the enforcement of
Brown would be "left to the judgment of the district court with practically
no safeguards." 326 Likewise, in the wake of Casey's undue burden standard,
there is considerable evidence that Democratic- and Republicanappointed jurists vote in ideologically predictable directions. 327 As one
activist lamented, "There's a real recognition that the lower court judges
hold vast power over women's reproductive lives. "328
Delegation of high-profile issues to the lower courts not only leads to
a patchwork of decisions but also poses risks to the inferior federal
judiciary itself. To the extent that lower courts are in charge of high-profile
issues, Presidents, senators, and interest groups have a strong incentive to
focus on the composition of the inferior federal bench-creating a divisive
process that puts at risk the long-term public reputation of the lower
courts. As Judge King suggests, a "highly partisan or ideological judicial
selection process conveys the notion to the electorate that judges are
simply another breed of political agents, that judicial decisions should be
in accord with political ideology," and these messages may "undermine
public confidence in the legitimacy of the [lower federal] courts." 329
2. Exploring the Legitimacy Tradeoffs. - The goal of this Essay
argue that the Justices should grant certiorari or issue a broad,
doctrine in every high-profile case. There are various reasons
Justices may opt not to hear a case or may struggle to formulate

is not to
rule-like
that the
a broad

324. Sykes, supra note 193, at 2:45:50-2:47:48; see also supra notes 191-192 (discussing
the lack of clarity in the Court's gun rights decisions).

325. Sykes, supra note 193, at 2:46:24-2:46:35.
326. Brown

ITranscript,

supra note 48, at 400 (quoting Thurgood Marshall).

327. See supra section II.B.3.
328. Scherer, supra note 29, at 19-20 (quoting Interview by Nancy Scherer with
Elizabeth Cavendish, supra note 161).
329. King, supra note 230, at 782; see also id. ("The loss of public confidence in the
legitimacy of the courts . . . could, in turn, undermine compliance .... ").
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doctrine.330 Instead, this Essay seeks to emphasize a point that seems to
have been overlooked by the literature on sociological legitimacy: the
potential tradeoffs between the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts.
Relatedly, this Essay aims to inspire both theoretical and empirical
scholarship on lower court legitimacy. As discussed, virtually all work on
judicial legitimacy is focused on the Supreme Court. Given the
increasingly contentious nature of lower court selection-and recent
attacks on "Obama judges" and "Trump judges"-there is a need to
systematically examine the lower courts' external reputation among elites
and the general public.
At bottom, this Essay contends that scholars and jurists should begin
to debate whether protecting the Supreme Court's external reputationthrough narrow decisions or certiorari denials-is worth the costs to the
remainder of the federal bench. That is by no means an easy analysis.
At the outset, we should recognize that it can be challenging to
discern whether a broad, rule-like decision will in fact undermine the
Supreme Court's legitimacy. Consider, in this regard, the reapportion3 Justices
ment cases. When the Court first considered Baker v. Carr,
Frankfurter and Harlan implored their colleagues to find the issue nonjusticiable; they worried that the Court's sociological legitimacy would be
severely damaged by entering that "political thicket."332 Yet, as Barry
Friedman has pointed out, the Court's decisions both to treat the issue as
justiciable and to adopt the one-person, one-vote rule turned out to be
quite popular with the public.333 A further complication involves the

330. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (acknowledging, for example, the
difficulty of reaching agreement on a multimember Court).

331. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
332. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter, J.)
(concluding that a challenge to congressional districts was nonjusticiable, and admonishing
the Court not to enter the "political thicket"); see also Kim Isaac Eisler, A Justice for All:
WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., and the Decisions that Transformed America 171-74 (1993) (noting
that Justice Frankfurter advocated dismissal in Baker v. Carr because he feared that a
decision on the merits "would constitute such a usurpation of court prerogatives, that it
would undermine the authority of the Court itself'); Whittington, Political Foundations,
supra note 96, at 126 (noting that Justices Frankfurter and Harlan both believed that a
decision on reapportionment "could only damage the Court in the long run"); Tara Leigh
Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1908, 1960-61
(2015) (discussing Justice Frankfurter's concerns during the deliberations over Baker v.
Carr).Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Bakerv. Carrunderscored these concerns. See 369 U.S.

at 267, 277-80 (Frankfurter,

J.,

dissenting) (arguing that the reapportionment lawsuits

should have been dismissed as nonjusticiable and warning that "[d] isregard" of such limits
"may well impair the Court's position" by undermining "public confidence in its moral
sanction").
333. See Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 28, at 268-69 (noting that, although
some officials opposed the Court's decisions-and even attempted to strip federal
jurisdiction over reapportionment issues-the Court's decisions were quickly implemented,
and stating that "[t]he reason for the prompt action and the defeat of all attempts to
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Court's sociological legitimacy across time. Brown v. Board of Educationwas
controversial in 1954, and the Court may have faced resistance if it had
issued a firm deadline in Brown I."
But over time, Brown has become
canonical (that is, one of the most respected decisions in Supreme Court
history) ,335 and the Court's failure to do more in Brown Ilhas been viewed
by many as a tragic mistake.33 6 It is worth asking whether the Court's longterm public reputation would have been enhanced by a more rule-like
implementation scheme for desegregation.
Nevertheless, despite such examples, commentators-and, more
importantly, many justices-have long assumed that broad, rule-like decisions in high-profile areas create risks for the Court's external legitimacy.
The Justices are therefore likely to perceive such a threat and to be
tempted to issue narrow or open-ended doctrines (or deny certiorari) in
order to preserve the Court's public reputation. The remainder of this
section explores whether the perceived benefits to the Supreme Court outweigh the risks to the remainder of the federal judiciary.
Some readers may suggest that the Supreme Court's reputation is far
more fragile than that of any given inferior federal court (or the lower
federal judiciary as a whole). The Court's decisions-at least in highprofile cases such as those involving abortion, affirmative action, or gun
rights-tend to garner more media attention than those of the lower
courts. And a Supreme Court decision would likely apply nationwide.
Accordingly, the effects of a broad, rule-like decision would be felt by
individuals throughout the country-and for that reason could generate
considerable resistance.
Yet the calculus is not so clear. Precisely because of the Supreme
Court's prominence in our society, it can be far more challenging to attack
the Court than a single district court judge (or the inferior federal
judiciary as a whole). Consider some prominent examples of court
curbing: court packing, jurisdiction stripping, and defiance of court
orders. An attempt to enlarge the Supreme Court may be far more
controversial than an expansion of the lower federal judiciary because the
Court is seen as far more consequential. Some scholars argue that Franklin
forestall it was obvious: the public loved these decisions"); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Was
Brandeis An Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 991
(1967) ("At least some of us who shook our heads over Baker v. Carrare prepared to admit
that it has not been futile, that it has not impaired, indeed that it has enhanced, the prestige
of the Court. It has been a peculiarly popular opinion.").
334. See supra section IIA.I.
335. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 963, 1018 (1998) (describing Brown as "[t]he classic example" of a canonical case);
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 381 (2011) (arguing that "the
constitutional canon [is] the set of decisions whose correctness participants in constitutional
argument must always assume" and "Brown . .
is the classic example").
336. See Bell, Silent Covenants, supra note 67, at 23 (describing Brown Has a "mistake"
in large part because it failed to guide and constrain lower federal courts); supra section

ILA.2 (noting criticisms of Brown Ii).
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Roosevelt's presidency was severely damaged because of his (unsuccessful)
attempt to pack the Supreme Court.337 And, as my past work has
documented, although there are political obstacles to any jurisdiction
stripping effort, there have historically been more roadblocks in the way
of attempts to cut off Supreme Court review. 338 Executive officials and
legislators often prefer the finality and uniformity that comes from a
Supreme Court decision; accordingly, throughout our history, many
political actors have defended the Court's jurisdiction, even when they
anticipated an adverse decision from the high bench. 339
That brings us to the concern at the heart of sociological legitimacy:
compliance. A presidential decision to defy a Supreme Court ruling would
likely create quite a stir. But a presidential decision to disobey a single
district court ruling (or perhaps multiple district court rulings) might not
garner as much attention, precisely because it would be seen as less
consequential. That is, it may be politically easier for a President to defy
an inferior federal court. 340
Accordingly, it is not clear which level of the judiciary is better
equipped to shoulder external criticisms. Consider the case of
desegregation. Some readers may share Bickel's intuition that the
Supreme Court in Brown II properly rejected the "shock treatment"

337. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional
Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt 156-61 (1995).
338. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of FederalJurisdiction, 124 Harv.

L. Rev. 869, 874, 888-916, 920-22 (2011) [hereinafter Grove, Structural Safeguards]
(providing a detailed review ofjurisdiction-stripping efforts, which underscores the political
obstacles to taking away the Supreme Court's appellate review power); see also Tara Leigh

Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 250, 253, 26890 (2012) [hereinafter Grove, Article II Safeguards] (detailing how the executive branch
has repeatedly opposed efforts to strip Supreme Court jurisdiction); Tara Leigh Grove, The
Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 960-62 (2013)
(discussing other failed court-curbing efforts, including proposals to impose a supermajority
requirement for striking down federal legislation).
339. See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 338, at 285; Grove, Structural
Safeguards, supra note 338, at 920-22.
340. The picture is further complicated by the possibility that district courts may issue
nationwide or universal injunctions. Presidents may be more inclined to defy such broad
orders. And yet the high-profile nature of such injunctions may also help insulate the district
judges who issue them. For a small sample of the rich literature on this topic, see Samuel L.
Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 420
(2017) (characterizing nationwide injunctions as a "recent development" in the history of
equity and advocating that federal courts should issue only "plaintiff-protective
injunction[s]" that restrain defendants' conduct "only with respect to the plaintiff');
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065, 1069 (2018)
(offering a "qualified" defense of nationwide injunctions as "the only means" in certain
cases "to provide plaintiffs with complete relief and avoid harm to thousands of individuals
similarly situated to the plaintiffs"); Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the "Universal"
Injunction, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 924 (2020) (arguing that federal courts have issued
nationwide injunctions for "well over a century" and that "the Article III objection to the
universal injunction should be retired").
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proposed by the NAACP and instead allowed a more gradual approach
through the "all deliberate speed" formula. 341 But Judge Wisdom offered
a very different assessment. Precisely because desegregation was a fraught
issue, Judge Wisdom argued that "[t]he Supreme Court ...
has an
obligation to lead or at least point out the logical line of development of
the law. "342
CONCLUSION

Scholars have largely overlooked the legitimacy tradeoffs within our
judicial hierarchy. To avoid sacrificing the sociological legitimacy of the
Supreme Court, the Justices may decline to issue the broad, rule-like
precedents that will most effectively clarify the law and guide lower courts
in high-profile cases. Instead, the Justices may issue narrow doctrines or
deny review altogether. Such an approach not only sacrifices meaningful
legal change but also poses risks to the long-term legitimacy of the inferior
federal judiciary. To the extent that our legal system aims to protect
sociological legitimacy, we should consider not simply the Supreme Court
but the entire federal bench.

341. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 26, at 250, 252-53.
342. Wisdom, supra note 84, at 420.
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